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IRREVERSIBLE AND CATASTROPHIC
Cass R Sunsteint
As many treaties and statutes emphasize, some risks are distinctive in
the sense that they are potentially irreversible or catastrophic; for such risks, it
is sensible to take extra precautions. When a harm is irreversible, and when
regulators lack information about its magnitude and likelihood, they should
purchase an "option" to prevent the harm at a later date-the Irreversible
Harm Precautionary Principle. This principle brings standard option theory
to bear on environmental law and risk regulation. And when catastrophic
outcomes are possible, it makes sense to take special precautions against the
worst-case scenarios-the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle. This
principle is based on three foundations: an emphasis on people's occasional
failure to appreciate the expected value of truly catastrophic losses; a recogni-
tion that political actors may engage in unjustifiable delay when the costs of
precautions would be incurred immediately and when the benefits would not
be enjoyed until the distant future; and an understanding of the distinction
between risk and uncertainty. This Article illustrates the normative argu-
ments in favor of these principles throughout with reference to the problem of
global warming; other applications include injunctions in environmental
cases, genetic modification of food, protection of endangered species, and
terrorism.
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INTRODUCTION
Many losses are irreversible. Once a species is gone, it is gone
forever. Transgenic crops can impose irreversible costs by increasing
pest resistance.' Because some greenhouse gases stay in the atmos-
phere for up to a century, the problem of global warming may be
irreversible, at least for all practical purposes. 2 Global warming could
be catastrophic as well, potentially endangering many millions of peo-
ple.3 Irreversible or catastrophic risks pose distinctive problems for
regulators; they require significant adjustments in the standard forms
I See generally Benoit Morel et al., Pesticide Resistance, the Precautionary Principle, and the
Regulation of Bt Corn: Real Option and Rational Option Approaches to Decisionmaking, in BAT-
TLING RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS AND PESTICIDES 184 (Ramanan Laxminarayan ed., 2003)
[hereinafter BATTLING RESISTANCE] (proposing option theory as an analytical framework
for the Precautionary Principle and applying that framework to the issue of commercializ-
ing Bt corn); Justus Wesseler, Resistance Economics of Transgenic Crops Under Uncertainty: A
Real Option Approach, in BATTLING RESISTANCE, supra, at 214 (discussing pest resistance as an
irreversible cost of transgenic crops).
2 SeeW. David Montgomery & Anne E. Smith, Global Climate Change and the Precaution-
ary Principle, 6 HuM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 399, 400 (2000).
3 See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 43-58 (2004).
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of cost-benefit analysis. 4 In any case, specialists in risk perception
have long emphasized the fact that under some circumstances, people
are especially averse to risks that are irreversible, potentially cata-
strophic, or both. 5
The Precautionary Principle, used in many international docu-
ments, 6 is often said to have a special place in the context of irreversi-
bility and catastrophe. 7 Consider a few examples:
" The closing Ministerial Declaration from a United Nations Ec-
onomic Conference for Europe in 1990 asserts, "In order to
achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on
the precautionary principle. . . . Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to pre-
vent environmental degradation.""
" The 1992 Rio Declaration states, "Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective mea-
sures to prevent environmental degradation." 9
" The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change states,
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing [regulatory] measures, taking into account that
policies and measures to deal with climate change should be
4 See Montgomery & Smith, supra note 2, at 406-10. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow &
Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON.
312 (1974) (discussing how consideration of an economic activity's irreversibility should
inform the cost-benefit calculus).
5 See Paul Slovic et al., Rating the Risks, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 104, 117-20 (Paul
Slovic ed., 2000).
6 See generally ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRIN-
CIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (2002) (discussing the Precautionary Principle as a founda-
tional principle of international law).
7 For a valuable and somewhat technical discussion of this issue, see generally Chris-
tian Gollier & Nicolas Treich, Decision-Making Under Scientific Uncertainty: The Economics of the
Precautionary Principle, 27J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 77 (2003). The Precautionary Principle
itself is explored infra Part I.
8 U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Bergen, Nor., May 8-16, 1990, Bergen Ministerial
Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, art. 1(7), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/
PC/10 (Aug. 6, 1990), reprinted in 1 Y.B. INr'L ENVrL. LAw 429 (1990), quoted in Julian
Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in RETHINKING RISK AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRIN-
CIPLE 1, 5 (Julian Morris ed., 2000).
9 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992,
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. 1
(Vol. I) (Jan. 1, 1993), quoted in BJ0RN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEA-
SURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD 348 (2001).
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cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possi-
ble cost.10
* The Final Declaration of the First European "Seas At Risk"
Conference states, "If the 'worst-case scenario' for a certain ac-
tivity is serious enough, then even a small amount of doubt as
to the safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it taking
place." 1
In American law, similar ideas are at work. A special precaution-
ary principle underlies the analysis of preliminary injunctions in cases
involving a risk of irreparable environmental harm.12 San Francisco
has adopted its own precautionary principle, with an emphasis on seri-
ousness and irreversibility:
Where threats of serious or irreversible damage to people or nature
exist, lack of full scientific certainty about cause and effect shall not
be viewed as sufficient reason for the City to postpone cost effective
measures to prevent the degradation of the environment or protect
the health of its citizens. 13
At the national level, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
requires agencies to discuss "any irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented."' 4 Courts have been careful to insist that
environmental impact statements should be prepared at a time that
permits consideration of environmental effects before irretrievable
commitments have been made.15 A number of federal statutes, espe-
cially in the environmental context, specifically refer to irreversible
losses and make their prevention a high priority.' 6
10 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3(3), May 9, 1992,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, quoted in INDUR M. GoKLANY, THE PRECAU-
TIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 6 (2001).
11 Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decision Making Under Uncertainty, in
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 71, 78 (Research in
Law and Economics vol. 20, Timothy Swanson ed., 2002) (quoting Seas at Risk, The Final
Declaration of the First European "Seas At Risk" Conference, Annex 1 (1994)).
12 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989). For the complexities of this
analysis, see infra Part II.E.
13 S.F., CAL., ENVIRONMENT CODE ch. 1, § 101 (2003), available at http://
www.sfenvironment.com/aboutus/innovative/pp/sfpp.htm.
14 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(C) (v), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (v)
(2000).
15 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 287 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (10th Cir.
2002).
16 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151 p-1 (c) (2) (A) (2000) (requiring the President to assist de-
veloping countries in a way that responds to "the irreversible losses associated with forest
destruction"); 33 U.S.C. § 2712(j) (2000) (making a special exception to the planning re-
quirement for use of federal resources in situations "requiring action to avoid irreversible
loss of natural resources"); 42 U.S.C. § 9611(i) (2000) (same exception for Superfund
cleanups).
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For a long period, both courts and the executive branch also re-
quired agencies to engage in "worst-case analysis," focusing on poten-
tial catastrophes. 17 That requirement has been eliminated by the
Council on Environmental Quality,18 but agencies continue to be di-
rected to explore "impacts which have catastrophic consequences,
even if their probability of occurrence is low."' 9 Under the Clean Air
Act, the Environmental Protection Agency is asked to build an "ade-
quate margin of safety" into health-based national ambient air quality
standards.20 This explicitly precautionary requirement is not limited
to irreversible or catastrophic harms, but it might well be understood
as an effort to ensure against them.
The central notions here-irreversibility and catastrophe-play a
critical role in many domains, and they lie at the heart of countless
discussions of how to deal with risks to safety, health, and the environ-
ment. The problem is that both notions are exceedingly ambiguous,
and it is by no means clear how regulators should understand them.
The central purpose of this Article is to unpack the ambiguities and to
identify the proper role of both concepts in law and policy. I shall
show that standard option theory, emphasizing the importance of irre-
versibility,21 has important implications for environmental law, and in-
deed that some statutes and doctrines display an implicit appreciation
of this point. I shall also show that regulators should sometimes at-
tempt to eliminate the worst-case scenario, even-or perhaps, espe-
cially-if they cannot assign a probability to its occurrence. When no
such probability can be assigned, the best approach is to assess what is
gained, and what is lost, by eliminating the most catastrophic out-
comes through regulation-a point that helps discipline the inquiry
into many risk-related problems, including global warming, terrorism,
and injunctions in environmental cases.
These general points lead to two refined versions of the Precau-
tionary Principle. The first involves irreversibility: When regulators lack
information about the likelihood and magnitude of a risk, it makes sense to
spend extra resources to buy an "option" to protect against irreversible harm
until future knowledge emerges. The value of the option is that of delay-
ing the decision until better information is available. An emphasis on
17 See Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1984); Sierra
Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 971 (5th Cir. 1983).
18 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355-56 (1989).
19 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2005).
20 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000). Simi-
larly, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (4) uses the term "ample margin of safety" in connection with
standards for emissions of pollutants.
21 For an influential discussion of irreversibility in the environmental law context, see
Arrow & Fisher, supra note 4.
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options and irreversibility leads to a distinctive principle, which I shall
call the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.
The second principle involves catastrophe: When risks have ex-
tremely bad worst-case scenarios, it makes sense to pay special attention to those
risks, even if they are unlikely to come to fruition, and even if existing informa-
tion does not enable regulators to make a reliable judgment about the
probability that they will occur. An emphasis on the need to attend to
potentially catastrophic risks also yields a distinctive principle, which I
shall call the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle.
At first glance, these two principles seem to justify aggressive ac-
tion to combat many environmental risks, including those posed by
global warming, threats to endangered species, and genetic modifica-
tion of food. Perhaps societies should invest substantial resources in
the reduction of greenhouse gases, first to prevent what might turn
out to be an irreversible loss, and second to stop the worst-case scena-
rios. 22 Outside of the environmental domain, the two principles bear
on appropriate steps to reduce the risks associated with terrorist at-
tacks, epidemics, asteroid collisions, earthquakes, hurricanes, and
more. An emphasis on the two principles also has the advantage of
suggesting the possibility of a rapprochement between the risk judg-
ments of experts and the risk judgments of ordinary people.23 As risk
analysts have long emphasized, ordinary people sometimes pay a great
deal of attention to whether risks are irreversible or potentially cata-
strophic. 24 If the refined precautionary principles are defensible,
then ordinary intuitions turn out to be plausible, and experts should
accept them. Indeed, the two principles might be combined, in cer-
tain cases, into a single Irreversible and Catastrophic Harm Precau-
tionary Principle, 25 which provides the strongest basis for aggressive
regulation of greenhouse gases.
At the same time, I shall show that both principles are subject to
important qualifications. The unifying claim is that the refined pre-
cautionary principles should be implemented with wide rather than
narrow viewscreens. They must be attentive to the full range of conse-
22 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 162, 184-86, 197. In particular Posner emphasizes "the
practically irreversible effect of greenhouse-gas emissions on the atmospheric concentra-
tion of those gases.... Making shallower cuts now can be thought of as purchasing an
option to enable global warming to be stopped or slowed at some future time at a lower
cost." Id. at 161-62.
23 See Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in THE PERCEPTION
OF RISK, supra note 5, at 137, 148-51.
24 See id. These psychometric studies coexist, however, with evidence that people dis-
miss many low-probability risks of catastrophe, as discussed infra Part III.A A simple exam-
ple is that people do not pay much attention to the risk of asteroid collisions, even though
there is a good argument that they should do so. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 24-29.
25 For an early treatment of similar issues, see generally Talbot Page, A Generic View of
Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1978).
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quences, not simply to a subset. A focus on irreversibility and cata-
strophic harm threatens to violate this principle through a kind of
selective perception. More particularly, the idea of irreversibility is ex-
ceedingly ambiguous; because time is linear, every step is in a literal
sense irreversible. In the technical literature, the problem of ambigu-
ity is solved through a particular definition of irreversibility. 26 But
under that definition, irreversibilities are usually on all sides of envi-
ronmental problems. If significant steps are taken to reduce green-
house gases, those very steps will inflict irreversible losses,
environmental or economic-making it necessary to explore the like-
lihood and magnitude of such losses in order to decide what to do.
An Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle is both coherent and
sensible, but it calls for precautions against the irreversible harms as-
sociated with environmental protection as well as environmental
neglect.
In addition, it can be costly, and even environmentally harmful,
to avoid worst-case scenarios. If those scenarios are exceedingly un-
likely, then there are clear limits on how much regulators should do
to eliminate them. If it would cost a great deal to avoid those scena-
rios, or if doing so would subject people to high probabilities of very-
bad-case scenarios, then avoiding the worst case may not be sensible.
It is both necessary and possible, in short, to explore what is gained
and what is lost by eliminating worst-case scenarios. As we shall see, an
understanding of the uses and limits of the refined versions of the
Precautionary Principle, focusing on irreversibility and catastrophe,
casts new light on the foundations of environmental law, and indeed
on all aspects of law that deal with the reduction of serious risks to
safety and health.27
This Article comes in four parts. Part I briefly explores the con-
ventional Precautionary Principle, emphasizing that precautionary
steps often produce risks of their own. Part II discusses the question
of irreversibility. The key point here is that because environmental
harms are often irreversible, it is appropriate to spend resources to
maintain flexibility for the future; the theory of real options has im-
portant implications for the theory and practice of environmental law,
and indeed for regulation in general. An understanding of the prob-
lem of irreversibility also helps to explain debates over the issuance of
preliminary injunctions in environmental cases. Armed with that un-
derstanding, we can discipline the analysis of injunctions in those
cases.
26 See, e.g., infra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
27 On related issues in tort law, see ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER
UNCERTAINTY (2001), which investigates the risk-of-damage notion together with the forms
of tort liability for externalized risks of damage.
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Part III turns to the risk of catastrophic harm. A particular focus
is the difference between risk, for which probabilities can be assigned
to various outcomes, and uncertainty, for which no such probabilities
can be assigned. With respect to catastrophe, risk aversion is perfectly
sensible, but it is hard to defend the idea that regulators should gener-
ally seek to eliminate the worst-case scenario, whatever the environ-
mental and other costs of doing so.
Part III also offers some experimental evidence that people do
not focus on the worst-case scenario under circumstances of either
risk or uncertainty. The most important point here is that a form of
cost-benefit balancing, perhaps with distributional weights, can in-
form the decision of whether to eliminate the most catastrophic out-
comes. Part IV offers some brief remarks on the question of whether
experts and ordinary people display "rival rationalities," and on the
relationship of irreversibility and catastrophe to that question.
I
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
In the face of risks of environmental harm, it has become com-
mon to invoke the Precautionary Principle, an increasingly influential
idea for environmental protection. 28 My principal concerns here are
irreversibility and catastrophe, but in order to understand those
problems, it is necessary to explore the Precautionary Principle more
generally.
Unfortunately, there are twenty or more definitions of the Pre-
cautionary Principle, and they are not all compatible with one an-
other.29 The most cautious and weakest versions suggest, quite
sensibly, that a lack of decisive evidence of harm should not be a
ground for refusing to regulate an activity. Controls might be justified
even if it is impossible to establish a definite connection between, for
example, low-level exposures to certain carcinogens and adverse ef-
fects on human health. Thus, the Ministerial Declaration of the Sec-
ond International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea,
held in London in 1987, sensibly suggests: "Accepting that, in order to
protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most dan-
gerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may
require action to control inputs of such substances even before a
28 See, e.g., PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AND PREVENTIVE PUBLIC POLICY (JUoel
A. Tickner ed., 2003). This section draws extensively from Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1003 (2003).
29 See Morris, supra note 8, at 1-19.
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causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific
evidence. 30
The widely publicized Wingspread Statement, produced during a
meeting of environmentalists in 1998, goes much further: "When an
activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment,
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect
relationships are not established scientifically. In this context the pro-
ponent of the activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden
of proof."3 1
In Europe, the Precautionary Principle is sometimes understood
in a still stronger way, suggesting that it is important to build "a mar-
gin of safety into all decision making."3 2 Another strong version sug-
gests that the principle means "that action should be taken to correct
a problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may occur, not after
the harm has already occurred."33 The word "may" is the crucial one
here, because it signals the need for corrective action even in the face
of merely speculative evidence that the risk is serious.3 4
In a comparably strong version, it is said that
the precautionary principle mandates that when there is a risk of
significant health or environmental damage to others or to future
generations, and when there is scientific uncertainty as to the na-
ture of that damage or the likelihood of the risk, then decisions
should be made so as to prevent such activities from being con-
ducted unless and until scientific evidence shows that the damage
will not occur.3 5
What is striking about this passage is its requirement that potentially
hazardous activities be prevented until they are shown to be safe. I
have noted that the Final Declaration of the First European "Seas At
Risk" Conference goes so far as to say that " [i] f the 'worst case scena-
rio' for a certain activity is serious enough, then even a small amount
30 Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, Nov. 25,
1987, Ministerial Declaration Calling for Reduction of Pollution, art. VII, 27 I.L.M. 835, 838
(1988) (emphasis omitted).
31 Morris, supra note 8, at 5 (quoting Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary
Principle, Jan. 26, 1998). Another strong version is defended in Carolyn Raffensperger &
Peter L. deFur, Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Rigorous Science and Solid Ethics, 5
HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 933, 934 (1999).
32 See LOMBORG, supra note 9, at 349.
33 Precautionary Principle, Word Spy, http://www.wordspy.com/words/precaution-
aryprinciple.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
34 See Introduction to THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY (Poul Har-
remos et al. eds., 2002).
35 Cloning, 2002, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Departments of Labor, Health and Human
Servs., and Education, and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 19
(2002) (statement of Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senatehearings&docid
=f:80530.pdf.
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of doubt as to the safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it taking
place."3 6
A. Hazardous Precautions
The weak versions of the Precautionary Principle are unobjec-
tionable and important. Every day, individuals and nations take steps
to avoid hazards that are far from certain. We do not walk in moder-
ately dangerous areas at night. We exercise. We buy smoke detectors.
We buckle our seatbelts. We might even avoid fatty foods (or carbohy-
drates). Sensible governments regulate risks that in individual cases
or even in the aggregate have a well under 100% chance of coming to
fruition.3 7 An individual might ignore a mortality risk of 1/500,000
because that risk is quite small, but if 100 million citizens face the
same risk, then the expected number of deaths is 200, and the nation
as a whole should take the problem seriously.
For the moment, let us understand the Precautionary Principle in
its strong form, to suggest that regulation is required whenever there
is a possible risk to health, safety, or the environment, even if the sup-
porting evidence remains speculative and the economic costs of regu-
lation are high. Recall that under the Final Declaration of the First
European "Seas At Risk" Conference, a serious worst-case scenario is
said to justify abandonment of activity even if there is only "a small
amount of doubt as to the safety of that activity"; 38 recall, too, that
under the National Environmental Policy Act, agencies must pay close
attention to risks that have only a small probability of occurrence. 39
To avoid absurdity, any emphasis on the idea of "possible risk" must
be understood to require a certain threshold of scientific plausibility.
To support regulation, no one thinks that it is enough if someone,
somewhere, urges that a risk is worth taking seriously. But under the
Precautionary Principle in its stronger forms, the threshold burden is
minimal, and once it is met, there is a presumption in favor of regula-
tory controls. These versions, as we shall see, help to clarify a signifi-
cant problem with the idea of precaution in a way that bears .on the
more refined versions of the principle as well.
The real problem with the Precautionary Principle, thus under-
stood, is that it offers no guidance-not that it is wrong, but that it
forbids all courses of action, including regulation. Taken seriously, it
is paralyzing, banning the very steps that it simultaneously requires.
In some cases, it should be easy to see that in its own way, stringent
regulation would actually run afoul of the Precautionary Principle.
36 Stewart, supra note 11, at 78.
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000).
38 Stewart, supra note 11, at 78.
39 See supra notes 17-20, 32 and accompanying text.
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Consider the "drug lag," produced whenever the government takes a
highly precautionary approach to the introduction of new medicines
and drugs onto the market.410 If a government insists on this ap-
proach, it will protect people against harms from inadequately tested
drugs in a way that fits well with the goal of precaution; but it will also
prevent people from receiving potential benefits from those very
drugs, and hence subject people to serious risks that they would not
otherwise face. Is it "precautionary" to require extensive premarket
testing, or to do the opposite? Or consider the case of DDT, often
banned or regulated in the interest of reducing risks to birds and
human beings. 41 The problem with such bans is that in poor nations,
they eliminate what appears to be the most effective way of combating
malaria-and thus significantly undermine public health. 42 Precau-
tionary steps seem both mandated and forbidden by the idea of pre-
caution in its strong forms.
Similar issues are raised by the continuing debate over whether
certain antidepressants impose a (small) risk of breast cancer.43 A
precautionary approach might seem to caution against use of such
antidepressants because of their carcinogenic potential. But the fail-
ure to use those antidepressants might well impose risks of its own,
certainly psychological and possibly even physical (because psycholog-
ical ailments are sometimes associated with physical ones as well). Or
consider the decision by the Soviet Union to evacuate and relocate
more than 270,000 people in response to the risk of adverse effects
from the Chernobyl fallout. 44 It is not clear that on balance, this mas-
sive relocation project was justified on health grounds: "A comparison
ought to [have been] made between the psychological and medical
burden of this measure (anxiety, psychosomatic diseases, depression
and suicides) and the harm that may have been prevented." 45 More
generally, a sensible government might want to ignore the small risks
associated with low levels of radiation, on the ground that precaution-
40 The drug-lag concept describes the delay of new drugs on the American market
compared to other countries; the drug lag is produced by regulatory requirements. See
HENRY G. GRAaowssu & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS 5-6
(1983); Kenneth I. Kaitin &Jeffrey S. Brown, A DrugLag Update, 29 DRUG INFo. J. 361, 361
(1995).
41 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 1122-23 (4th ed.
2003).
42 See id.; GoKLAN4, supra note 10, at 13-27.
43 Compare, e.g., Judith P. Kelly et al., Risk of Breast Cancer According to Use of Antidepres-
sants, Phenothiazines, and Antihistamines, 150 Am. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 861 (1999) (finding no
association between antidepressant use and breast cancer), with C.R. Sharpe et al., The
Effects of Tricyclic Antidepressants on Breast Cancer Risk, 86 BRIT. J. CANCER 92 (2002) (finding
an elevated risk of breast cancer with heavy use of tricyclic antidepressants).
44 See Maurice Tubiana, Radiation Risks in Perspective: Radiation-Induced Cancer Among
Cancer Risks, 39 RADIATION & ENVWL. Bior'Isxcs 3, 9 (2000).
45 Id. at 9-10.
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ary responses are likely to cause a level of fear that outweighs any
health benefits from those responses.46
The Precautionary Principle is often invoked in connection with
genetic modification of food 47 -a plausible invocation in light of the
multiple risks created by that practice. 48 But many people believe that
a failure to allow genetic modification might well result in numerous
deaths. 49 The reason is that genetic modification holds out the prom-
ise of producing food that is both cheaper and healthier-resulting,
for example, in "golden rice," which might save many lives in develop-
ing countries.50 The point is not that genetic modification will likely
have those benefits, or that the benefits of genetic modification out-
weigh the risks. The claim is only that if the Precautionary Principle is
taken literally, it is offended by regulation as well as by nonregulation.
These examples suggest that regulation sometimes violates the
Precautionary Principle because it gives rise to "substitute risks," in the
form of hazards that materialize, or are increased, as a result of regula-
tion.51 It is possible to go much further. A great deal of evidence
suggests the possibility that an expensive regulation can have adverse
effects on life and health.52 An early study found that a statistical life
can be lost for every expenditure of $7.25 million;53 a later study sug-
gests that an expenditure of $15 million produces a loss of life. 54 An-
other suggests that poor people are especially vulnerable to this
effect-that a regulation that reduces wealth for the poorest 20% of
the population will have twice as large a mortality effect as a regula-
tion that reduces wealth for the wealthiest 20%. 55 To be sure, both
46 For some counterevidence in another important context, see Lennart Hardell et
al., Further Aspects on Cellular and Cordless Telephones and Brain Tumours, 22 INT'L J. ONCOL-
ocw 399 (2003), which discusses evidence of an association between analog cellular tele-
phones and cancer.
47 See, e.g., GoKL.ANY, supra note 10, at 29-56.
48 See Morel et al., supra note 1, at 185-86.
49 See, e.g., Kym Anderson & Chantal Pohl Nielsen, Golden Rice and the Looming GMO
Trade Debate: Implications for the Poor (Centre for Econ. Policy Res., Discussion Paper No.
4195, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=508463.
50 See id.; see also GoKa.ANv, supra note 10, at 30-41 (discussing environmental and
health benefits of engineered crops).
51 See the discussion of risk-related tradeoffs in RIsK VERSUS RISK (John D. Graham &
Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) and CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 133-52 (2002).
52 Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS
147 (1990) (explaining results that "suggest that some expensive regulations and programs
intended to save lives may actually lead to increased fatalities"); Randall Lutter & John F.
Morrall III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 43, 49 tbl.l (1994).
53 See Keeney, supra note 52, at 155.
54 See ROBERT W. HAHN ET AL., Do FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MORTALITY? 7
(2000).
55 See Kenneth S. Chapman & Govind Hariharan, Do Poor People Have a Stronger Rela-
tionship Between Income and Mortality than the Rich? Implications of Panel Data for Health-Health
Analysis, 12J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 51, 58-60 (1996).
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the phenomenon and the underlying mechanisms are disputed.56 It
is unnecessary to accept any particular figures here, or even to suggest
that there has been an unambiguous demonstration of an association
between mortality and regulatory expenditures. The only point is that
reasonable people believe in that association. It follows that a multi-
million-dollar expenditure for "precaution" has-as a worst-case sce-
nario-significant adverse health effects, with an expenditure of $600
million leading to perhaps as many as sixty lives lost.
This point makes the Precautionary Principle hard to implement
not merely when regulation removes opportunity benefits, or in-
troduces or increases substitute risks, but in any case in which the reg-
ulation costs a significant amount. If this is so, the Precautionary
Principle, for that very reason, raises doubts about many regulations.
If the principle argues against any action that carries a small risk of
imposing significant harm, then regulators should be reluctant to re-
quire large expenditures to reduce risks, simply because those ex-
penditures themselves carry risks. Here is the sense in which the
Precautionary Principle is paralyzing: It stands as an obstacle to regu-
lation and nonregulation, and to everything in between.
A nation-by-nation study commissioned by the German Federal
Environmental Agency goes so far as to conclude that there are two
separate camps in the industrialized world: "precaution countries"
(Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United States) and "pro-
tection countries" (Japan, France, and the United Kingdom).57 If the
argument thus far is correct, this conclusion is implausible-not em-
pirically but conceptually. The universe of risks is far too large to per-
mit categorizations of this kind. The most general point is that no
nation is precautionary in general, and costly precautions are inevita-
bly taken against only those hazards that seem especially salient or
insistent.58 Taken in its strongest and crudest forms, the Precaution-
ary Principle wrongly suggests that nations can and should adopt a
general form of risk aversion. It is possible to take precautions against
particular risks, but it is not possible to take precautions against all of
them. It is possible to display aversion to particular hazards, but it is
not possible to display aversion to all of them.59
56 See Lutter & Morrall, supra note 52.
57 See Peter H. Sand, The Precautionary Principle: A European Perspective, 6 HuM. & Eco-
LOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 445, 448 (2000).
58 See David Vogel, The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and
Environmental Regulation in Europe, 33 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 557, 570-71 (2003) (attributing
Europe's increased enthusiasm for precautionary regulation to past regulatory failures).
59 It might be tempting to defend the Precautionary Principle-certainly in the
health, safety, and environmental context-on the ground that early warnings, offering
only suggestive evidence of harm, often turn out to be correct. See THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY, supra note 34. And it is right to insist that indisputable
proof of harm should not be required to justify regulation; this is the sense in which the
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B. A Note on Distributional Issues
Those who endorse the Precautionary Principle often do so on
grounds of fairness, believing that the principle will assist the most
vulnerable members of society.60 Does the principle actually have that
effect? In the United States, the Clean Air Act takes a highly precau-
tionary approach, requiring an "adequate margin of safety" and hence
regulation in the face of scientific uncertainty.61 At the same time, the
Clean Air Act delivers especially large benefits to poor people and
members of minority groups-larger benefits, on balance, than it
gives to wealthy people. 62 In the international domain, aggressive ac-
tion to combat climate change might benefit poor countries more
than wealthy ones.63 In the context of global warming, at least, the
Precautionary Principle could be invoked to prevent especially severe
burdens on those in the worst position to bear them.
It makes a great deal of sense to emphasize the distribution of
domestic or international risks, and the distributional effects of global
warming are among the strongest points in favor of aggressive regula-
tion of greenhouse gases. 64 But in many cases, the Precautionary Prin-
weak version of the principle is both unobjectionable and important. But the fact that
suggestive evidence must be taken seriously does not render the strong version coherent,
simply because suggestive evidence of harm is often on all sides. In any case, suggestive
evidence of harm has often been found not to be an early warning worth heeding, but
instead a false alarm, producing unjustified fear and significant social losses of many kinds.
See ALLAN MAZUR, TRUE WARNINGS AND FALSE ALARMs 2 (2004). Consider the fears of fluo-
ridated water in the 1950s, contaminated cranberries in 1959, MSG in Chinese food in
1968, cyclamate in 1968, or mercury in tuna in 1970. None of these widely publicized
"hazards" posed a serious threat. Id. at 110-41. Mazur makes a valuable effort to distin-
guish between prescient warnings and false ones, see id. at 87-96, suggesting that "[t]he
clearest hallmark of a true public warning during the period 1948-1971 was a reputable
scientific news source. Warnings reaching the press from scientists operating in a conven-
tional way at an orthodox scientific institution were true more than twice as often as those
reaching the news from government officials or citizen advocates," id. at 97.
60 See, e.g., FRANK AcKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EvERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 230 (2004).
61 Supra note 20; see Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("In setting margins of safety the Administrator need not regulate only the known
dangers to health, but may 'err' on the side of overprotection by setting a fully adequate
margin of safety.").
62 See Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaies of Clean Air Act Regulation, REGULATION,
Spring 2001, at 34, 37 (showing that poorer people experienced greater overall improve-
ments in air quality than wealthier people based on spatial distributions of pollution).
63 See, e.g., LOMBORG, supra note 9, at 291-302 (noting that "developing countries will
be hit much harder by global warming, partly because they are much poorer and conse-
quently have less adaptive capacity"); Joseph E. Aldy, Peter R. Orszag &Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Climate Change: An Agenda for Global Collective Action 7 (Oct. 2001) (unpublished man-
uscript, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/stiglitz.pdf).
64 Note, however, that if the concern involves poor countries, it is not entirely clear
that global warming is an especially high priority, in light of perhaps more pressing needs
of those countries-needs that might be more efficiently met by resources that wealthy
nations would otherwise devote to regulating greenhouse-gas emissions. For controversial
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ciple, as applied, would have unfortunate distributional effects.
Consider the case of DDT. A ban on DDT, often supported by refer-
ence to the Precautionary Principle, 65 is eminently justified in wealthy
nations. But such a ban is likely to have-and is actually having-
unfortunate effects in at least some poor countries, where DDT is the
cheapest and most effective way of combating serious diseases, most
notably malaria. 66 The case of genetic modification of food might
well be a similar example; according to some projections, the benefits
are likely to be enjoyed by poor people, not the wealthy.67 And recall
that expensive regulations have a disproportionately serious effect on
poor people, simply because any price increases are hardest for them
to handle and because the costs of regulation may well manifest them-
selves in fewer and less remunerative jobs.68
Distributional issues should indeed be a central concern of a sys-
tem of risk regulation, 69 but the Precautionary Principle is a crude,
indirect, and sometimes perverse way of incorporating distributional
concerns. As a result, an emphasis on distribution does not rescue the
Precautionary Principle from the charge of incoherence. The real
question is whether more refined understandings of the principle can
be developed.
II
UNCERTAINTY, OPTIONS, AND IRREVERSIBILITY
It is possible to identify an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Prin-
ciple, applicable to a subset of environmental risks.70 On plausible
assumptions, the problem of irreversibility does justify aggressive mea-
sures to combat environmental risks, under a general attitude of "act,
then learn," as opposed to the tempting alternative of "wait and
learn." With respect to global warming, for example, some people
believe that it is most sensible to use research as the first line of de-
fense, refusing to commit substantial resources until evidence of harm
is clear.71 But if research alone allows continued emissions to pro-
but illuminating treatments, see GoiuANy, supra note 10, at 71-88; LOMBORG, supra note 9,
at 322-23.
65 See GouLAN, supra note 10, at 14.
66 See id at 13-27; SUNSTEIN, supra note 51, at 14.
67 See GoKLANj, supra note 10, at 47-50.
68 See Keeney, supra note 52, at 148.
69 On some of the complexities involved here, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 51, at 124-26.
70 See Scott Farrow, Using Risk-Assessment, Benefit-Cost Analysis, and Real Options to Imple-
ment a Precautionary Principle, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 727, 728 (2004) (discussing option theory
and reversibility).
71 See, e.g., WILFRED BECKERMAN, SMALL IS STUPID 102-03 (1995); Robert Mendelsohn,
Perspective Paper 1.1, in GLOBAL CRlSES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 44, 47 (Bjorn Lomborg ed.,
2004). The cautious approach of the Bush Administration can be understood in this light.
See THE WHITE HousE, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY BOOK (2002), available at http://
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duce irreversible risks, it might be best to take precautions now as a
way of preserving future flexibility. 72 In the environmental context in
general, this point suggests that regulators should proceed with far
more aggressive measures than would otherwise seem justified. 73
A. Option Value Versus Use Value
Begin with the monetary valuation of an environmental amenity,
such as a pristine area. Some people will be willing to pay to use the
area; others will be willing to pay to preserve it, even if they will not
use it. Hence, "existence value" is sometimes included in the valua-
tion of environmental amenities, 74 and indeed federal courts have in-
sisted that agencies pay attention to that value in assessing damages to
natural resources. 75 But some people are also willing to pay for the
option to use an environmental amenity in the future, even if they are
unsure whether they will exercise that option.76 Suppose that a pris-
tine area might be developed in a way that ensures irreversible
change. Many people would be willing to pay a significant amount to
preserve their option. Under federal law, option value must also be
considered in the assessment of natural resource damages. 77 Many
regulations explore the role of option value in the environmental
context.78
Here, then, is a simple sense in which irreversible environmental
harm causes a loss that is not adequately captured in the standard
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html; see also Chuck Hagel &
Frank Murkowski, High Costs of Kyoto, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2000, at A17 (explaining the
need for research). Economists Nordhaus and Boyer find that extremely little is lost by a
ten-year delay in emissions reductions. See WILLIAM D. NoPDHAUS &JOSEPH BOYER, WARM-
ING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 127 (2000) (describing the net
loss as "trivially small"). For a technical discussion, see Alistair Ulph & David Ulph, Global
Warming, Irreversibility and Learning, 107 ECON. J. 636 (1997).
72 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 161-62.
73 See Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Global Environmental Risks, J. ECON.
PERSP., Fall 1993, at 65, 80.
74 See Charles J. Cicchetti & Louis L. Wilde, Uniqueness, Irreversibility, and the Theory of
Nonuse Values, 74 AM.J. AGRic. ECON. 1121, 1121 (1992); David A. Dana, Existence Value and
Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 343, 345 (2004).
75 See, e.g., Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
76 Cf Cicchetti & Wilde, supra note 74, at 1122 (noting Weisbrod's analogy of such
amenities to public goods, in that "individuals who may never purchase the commodity still
hold a value for the option to do so"). The independent use of option value is, however,
challenged in various places. See, e.g., A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES 249-51 (2003) (suggesting that "what has been called
an option value is really just the algebraic difference between the expected values of two
different points on a WTP [willingness-to-pay] locus").
77 See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 464.
78 See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Critical
Habitat for the Mexcian Spotted Owl, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,914, 29,928 (June 6, 1995) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 1062,
1078 (proposed Jan. 7, 1994) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990).
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economic measure of value. Some skeptics contend that it "is hard to
imagine a price for an irreversible lOSS," 79 but people do identify
prices for such losses.80
B. The Basic Argument
The idea of option value, as used in the monetary valuation litera-
ture just discussed, is closely related to the use of the notion of "op-
tions" in the domain that I shall be emphasizing here. The simple
claim is that when regulators are dealing with an irreversible loss, and
when they are uncertain about the timing and likelihood of that loss,
they should be willing to pay a sum-the option value-in order to
maintain flexibility for the future.81 The option might not be exer-
cised if it turns out that the loss is not a serious one. But if the option
is purchased, regulators will be in a position to forestall the loss if it
turns out to be large.
In the domain of finance, options take multiple forms.8 2 An in-
vestor might be willing to purchase land that is known to have depos-
its of gold; even if the cost of extraction is currently too high to justify
mining, ownership of the land creates an option to mine if the market
price for gold increases, the cost of mining decreases, or both.8 3 A
standard "call option" is the right but not the obligation to purchase
an asset prior to a specific date at a specified price.8 4 In another varia-
tion, people might seek the right to abandon a project at a fixed price,
perhaps on the occurrence of a specified set of events. Alternatively,
they might obtain the right to scale back a project, to expand it, or to
extend its life. Options that recognize multiple sources of uncertainty
of the sort that can be found for many environmental problems are
termed "rainbow options. '85
Option theory has countless applications outside of the domain
of investments. Suppose, for example, that because of law or social
norms, it is difficult to divorce, so that a decision to marry cannot
79 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 60, at 185.
80 For a helpful overview, see Richard C. Bishop, Option Value: An Exposition and Exten-
sion, 58 LAND ECON. 1 (1982). In recognizing the existence of option value, I do not mean
to make any controversial suggestions about the role of "willingness to pay" in environmen-
tal policy. The only point is that people do place a value on preserving environmental
options, and that it would be foolish for regulators to refuse to do so.
81 See Claude Henry, Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: The "Irreversibility Effect, "64
AM. ECON. REv. 1006, 1006 (1974) ("A decision is considered irreversible if it significantly
reduces for a long time the variety of choices that would be possible in the future."). On
precommitment value, see Part II.D.3.
82 See TOM COPELAND & VLADIMIR ANrliKARov, REAL OPTIONS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
12-13 (2001).
83 See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
563 (2003).
84 See id. at 564.
85 COPELAND & ANTIKAROV, supra note 82, at 13.
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readily be reversed. If so, prospective spouses might be willing to in-
cur costs to maintain their flexibility before marrying-higher costs
than they would be willing to incur if divorce were easier. 86 Narrow
judicial rulings, of the sort celebrated by judicial minimalists,8 7 can be
understood as a way of "buying" an option, or at least of "paying" a
certain amount in return for flexibility. Judges who leave things unde-
cided and who focus their rulings on the facts of particular cases are
in a sense forcing themselves, and society as a whole, to purchase an
option in return for flexibility in the resolution of subsequent
problems. Whether that option is worthwhile depends on its price
and the benefits that it provides.
It should be readily apparent that an understanding of option
value might explain the emphasis in NEPA and other environmental
statutes on irreversible losses. The central point of NEPA is to ensure
that environmental factors receive serious consideration,88 and if irre-
versible losses are involved, the delay produced by the duty to gener-
ate an environmental impact statement can be seen as payment for an
option. It should also be clear that the idea of option value might
help give content to the Precautionary Principle, which would, on this
view, be understood as requiring societies to pay a kind of premium in
the face of potentially irreversible losses.89 An important implication
involves global warming: The argument for a global carbon tax is sig-
nificantly strengthened by an appreciation of the option value of con-
serving the atmospheric environment.90  Let us elaborate the
argument for the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.
In a classic essay, Arrow and Fisher demonstrate that the ideas of
uncertainty and irreversibility have considerable importance to the
theory of environmental protection.91 They imagine a situation in
which the question is whether to preserve a virgin redwood forest for
wilderness recreation, or instead, to open it to clear-cut logging.9 2 As-
sume that if the development option is chosen, then the destruction
of the forest is effectively irreversible.93 Arrow and Fisher argue that it
matters whether the authorities cannot yet assess the costs or benefits
86 See AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 24-25
(1994).
87 See generally CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999) (discussing judicial
minimalism on the Supreme Court).
88 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1989).
89 See Morel et al., supra note 1.
90 See Chichilnisky & Heal, supra note 73, at 80.
91 See Arrow & Fisher, supra note 4.
92 Id. at 314.
93 The assumption may be unrealistic, under ordinary understandings of what counts
as irreversibility. If seeds are retained, the forest can be recreated, though perhaps with a
significant interim loss. I deal below with some of the complexities in the notion of
irreversibility.
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of a proposed development. If development produces "some irrevers-
ible transformation of the environment, hence a loss in perpetuity of
the benefits from preservation," then it is worth paying something to
wait to acquire the missing information. 94 Their suggestion is that
"the expected benefits of an irreversible decision should be adjusted
to reflect the loss of options it entails. '95
Much more recently, Fisher has generalized this argument to sug-
gest that "[w] here a decision problem is characterized by (1) uncer-
tainty about future costs and benefits of the alternatives, (2) prospects
for resolving or reducing the uncertainty with the passage of time, and
(3) irreversibility of one or more of the alternatives, an extra value, an
option value, properly attaches to the reversible alternative (s).'196 To
pass a cost-benefit test, it follows that an irreversible decision must
clear a higher hurdle than a reversible one. The intuition here is
both straightforward and appealing: More steps should be taken to
prevent harms that are effectively final than to prevent those that can
be reversed at some cost. If an irreversible harm is on one side and a
reversible one on the other, an understanding of option value sug-
gests that it is worthwhile to spend a certain amount to preserve future
flexibility by paying a premium to avoid the irreversible harm.
Judge Richard Posner has invoked a point of this sort as ajustifi-
cation for aggressive steps to combat global warming.9 7 Judge Posner
acknowledges that the nature of the threat of global warming is dis-
puted, and hence, it is tempting to wait to regulate until we have more
information. But there is a serious problem with waiting, which is "the
practically irreversible effect of greenhouse-gas emissions on the at-
mospheric concentration of those gases."98 Thus, Judge Posner rea-
sons that "[m]aking shallower cuts now can be thought of as
purchasing an option to enable global warming to be stopped or
slowed at some future time at a lower cost."99 The reduction in total
cost as a result of current steps could result from lowering current
emissions or simply from increasing the rate of technological innova-
tions that make pollution reduction less costly in the future. Judge
Posner concludes that "[t]he option approach is applicable to other
94 See Arrow & Fisher, supra note 4, at 313-14.
95 Id. at 319.
96 See Anthony C. Fisher, Uncertainty, Irreversibility, and the Timing of Climate Policy
9 (Oct. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUp
loads/timing%5Ffisher%2Epdf).
97 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 161-62. A more technical discussion to the same effect
is contained in Chichilnisky & Heal, supra note 73, emphasizing the need for a distinctive
approach to "risks that are poorly understood, endogenous, collective and irreversible." Id. at 67.
For a more detailed treatment of option value and irreversibility, see id. at 76-84.
98 POSNER, supra note 3, at 161-62.
99 Id. at 162.
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catastrophic risks as well, such as the risks associated with genetically
modified crops."' 00
The general point here is that, as in the stock market, those in-
volved in environmental protection are trying to project a stream of
costs and benefits over time; the ability to project the revenue stream
will improve and hence much can be gained from being able to make
the decision later in time rather than earlier. 1 1 If more accurate deci-
sions can be made in the future, then there is a (bounded) value to
putting the decision off to a later date.' 0 2 The key point is that uncer-
tainty and irreversibility should lead to a sequential decision-making
process.'0 3 If better information will emerge, regulators might seek
an approach that preserves greater flexibility. 10 4
C. Irreversibilities
Unfortunately, the idea of irreversibility is highly ambiguous. On
one view, an effect is irreversible when restoration to the status quo is
impossible or at best extremely difficult, at least on a relevant times-
cale. For example, "[t]he decision not to preserve a rich reservoir of
biodiversity such as the 60 million-year-old Korup forest in Nigeria is
irreversible. The alteration or destruction of a unique asset of this
type has an awesome finality .... 1 05 If this is the appropriate inter-
pretation of irreversibility, then it is an aspect of seriousness. An alter-
native interpretation, familiar in the economic literature on options,
sees irreversibility in terms of sunk costs. The two interpretations lead
to different understandings of the Irreversible Harm Precautionary
Principle.
1. Irreversibility and Seriousness
From one point of view, no clear line separates the reversible
from the irreversible. The question is not whether some effect can be
reversed, but instead at what cost; areas that have been developed or
otherwise harmed can often be returned to their original state, even if
at considerable expense. Lost forests, for example, can be restored.
But for the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, there is a more
serious conceptual difficulty, which is that whether a particular act is irre-
100 Id. at 163.
101 See Gollier & Treich, supra note 7, at 84, for the definition of irreversibility used in
the real options approach. See also id. at 87-91 for distinctions among stock externalities,
environmental irreversibility, and capital irreversibility.
102 Id. at 88.
103 See Chan S. Park & Hemantha S.B. Herath, Exploiting Uncertainty-Investment Oppor-
tunities as Real Options: A New Way of Thinking in Engineering Economics, 45 ENGINEERING
ECONOMIST 1, 3-4 (2000).
104 See Arrow & Fisher, supra note 4, at 313-14.
105 See Chichilnisky & Heal, supra note 73, at 76.
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versible depends on how it is characterized. Any death, of any living crea-
ture, is irreversible, and those who invoke irreversibility do not intend
the notion of irreversible harm to apply to each and every mortality
risk. What is true for living creatures is true for rocks and refrigera-
tors, too; if these are destroyed, they are destroyed forever. And be-
cause time is linear, every decision is, in an intelligible sense,
irreversible. If I play tennis at 11:00 a.m. today, that decision cannot
be reversed, and what might have been done at that time will have
been permanently lost. If the government builds a new highway in
upstate New York in May, that particular decision will be irreversible,
even though the highway can be replaced or eliminated. This is the
sense in which irreversibility depends on how the underlying act is
characterized; if we characterize it narrowly, to be and to do precisely
what it is and does, any act is irreversible by definition.
Environmentalists who are concerned about irreversibility must
have something far more particular in mind. They must mean some-
thing like a large-scale alteration in environmental conditions, one
that imposes permanent, or nearly permanent, changes on those sub-
ject to them. But irreversibility in this sense is not a sufficient reason
for a highly precautionary approach. At a minimum, the irreversible
change has to be for the worse, and it must also rise to a certain level
of magnitude. A truly miniscule change in the global temperature,
even if permanent, would not justify expensive precautions if it is be-
nign or if it imposes little in the way of harm. 10 6 For this reason, it is
tempting to understand the idea of irreversibility, for environmental
purposes, as inseparable from that of seriousness. A loss of a wisdom
tooth is irreversible, but it is not a reason for particular precautions; a
loss of an extremely small forest, with little wildlife, hardly justifies a
special principle, even if that loss cannot be reversed.
At first glance, then, irreversibility matters only because of its con-
nection with the magnitude of the harm-an issue I explore below in
connection with potentially catastrophic risks. Compare in this regard
the standard of irreparable harm as a precondition to the grant of a
preliminary injunction. 10 7 If a harm is irreparable, it can be avoided
only by grant of the injunction, but irreparability is not a sufficient
condition for granting the injunction; the harm must be serious as
well as irreparable.108 And if irreversibility in environmental protec-
tion is to be analyzed in the same way, then an Irreversible Harm Pre-
cautionary Principle is part of a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
106 Cf Mendelsohn, supra note 71, at 47 (arguing against costly steps for global
warming).
107 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 499-501 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing
irreparable harm in the environmental context).
108 See id.
2006]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Principle, or at least a Significant Harm Precautionary Principle. If so,
the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle is not distinctive. The
principle is also vulnerable, some of the time, to the same objections
that apply to the Precautionary Principle as a whole. As we have seen,
significant harms may well be on all sides of risk-related problems, and
a focus on one set of risks will give rise to others, perhaps environmen-
tal risks as well.
2. Irreversibility and Sunk Costs
Analysts of real options understand the idea of irreversibility in a
technical way. 109 Irreversible investments are sunk costs-those that
cannot be recovered. Examples include expenditures on advertising
and marketing, or even capital investments designed to improve the
performance of a factory.110 In fact the purchase of motor vehicles,
computers, and office equipment is not fully reversible, because
purchase cost substantially exceeds resale value."1 Examples of re-
versible investments include the purchase of ordinary stocks and
bonds. The problem with an investment that is irreversible is that
those who make it relinquish "the possibility of waiting for new infor-
mation to arrive that might affect the desirability or timing of the ex-
penditure[,] . . .[and] [t]his lost option value is an opportunity cost
that must be included as part of the investment."' 1 2
Everyone agrees that we should characterize as irreversible harms
environmental effects that are both serious and extremely expensive
and time consuming to reverse.11 3 This is the factor that leads Judge
Posner and others to argue for the purchase of an "option" to slow
down global warming at a lower rate in the future. 114 Immediate
adoption of a policy produces a "sunk benefit." But this argument
ignores an important point: Irreversibility, in this sense, lies on all sides.'1 5
Regulation that reduces one environmental risk might well increase
another. Efforts to reduce dangers associated with fossil-fuel use, for
example, may lead to increased dependence on nuclear energy, as has
happened in China.116 As with the Precautionary Principle in gen-
109 See DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 86, at 6.
110 See id. at 8.
111 See id.
112 Id. at 6.
113 See Fisher, supra note 96, at 5-9.
114 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
115 See Fisher, supra note 96, at 10.
116 See, e.g., Ling Zhong, Note, Nuclear Energy: China's Approach Towards Addressing
Global Warming, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REV. 493 (2000). It is, of course, possible to urge
nations to reduce their reliance on coal or nuclear power and move instead toward alterna-
tives that would be preferable on risk-related grounds, such as solar power. For a general
discussion, see RENEWABLE ENERGY (Godfrey Boyle ed., 1996); Dan E. Arvizu, Advanced En-
ergy Technology and Climate Change Policy Implications, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 435 (2001). But
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eral, so it is with the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle in par-
ticular: Measures that the principle requires on grounds of safety and
health might well be prohibited on those same grounds. And there is
a more general point. If steps are taken to reduce greenhouse-gas
emissions, capital costs will be incurred, and they cannot be recouped.
Sunk costs are a familiar feature of environmental regulation, in the
form of mandates that require technological change. 1 7 We are deal-
ing, then, with irreversibilities, not irreversibility.
This point complicates the case for an Irreversible Harm Precau-
tionary Principle. As Fisher writes for global warming, "[I]t is not
clear whether the conditions of the problem imply that investment in
control ought to be slowed or reduced, while waiting for information
needed to make a better decision, or that investment should come
sooner to preserve the option to protect ourselves from impacts that
may be revealed in the future as serious or even catastrophic."'1 8 It is
for this reason that many economists have concluded, unlike Judge
Posner, that the existence of uncertainty and irreversibility argue for
less, not more, in way of investments in reducing greenhouse-gas emis-
sions.1 19 Everything depends on the likelihood and magnitude of the
losses on all sides.
Judge Posner's analysis does not use the idea of options in the
technical sense. He emphasizes, correctly, that because of the cumu-
lative effect of emissions on the atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide, a steady or even declining rate of emissions will cause that
concentration to increase. 120 He emphasizes that it may be more
costly to slow global warming in the future than in the presentl 21-a
point that comes close to the technical understanding of irreversibility
in the economic literature. But it is a gap in Judge Posner's analysis
that he neglects to attend to the irreversible losses associated with
greenhouse-gas reductions. On the other hand, any advice to wait and
learn depends on a contentious empirical assumption, which is that
we lose very little if we defer investments while waiting to obtain more
information about the benefits.' 22 If a great deal is lost by deferring
these alternatives pose problems of their own, involving feasibility and expense. See, e.g.,
LOMBORG, supra note 9, at 118-36.
117 See, e.g., BRUCE A. AcKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981)
(discussing the Clean Air Act).
118 Fisher, supra note 96, at 11.
119 See, e.g., id. at 19 (" [T] he sense one gets from the.., economic literature... is that
[uncertainty and irreversibility] cut in the direction of slowing or reducing investment in
control of greenhouse gas emissions rather than speeding or increasing it.").
120 POSNER, supra note 3, at 161-63.
121 See id.
122 See generally William R. Cline, Rejoinder to Perspective Papers 1.1 and 1.2, in GLOBAL
CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, supra note 71, at 56, 57 (critiquing a global-warming model for
its reliance on a wait-and-learn approach).
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such investments, then the judgment should be reversed. There is
reason to believe that for global warming, the irreversible losses associ-
ated with climate change do indeed justify the irreversible losses asso-
ciated with greater investments in emissions reductions worldwide. 123
D. Qualifications and Conclusions
The arguments for an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle,
along with an understanding of its central limitations, are now in
place. But there are three important qualifications, involving optimal
delay, distributional considerations, and precommitment value. Let
us briefly explore each of these.
1. Irreversibilities and Optimal Delay
The general notion of optimal delay provides important counter-
vailing considerations. Future generations will almost certainly be
both wealthier and more knowledgeable than the present generation;
for this reason, they will be in a far better position, or possibly an
unimaginably better position, to handle environmental problems that
materialize in their time.124 In the view of one commentator, the
nearly inevitable increase in wealth over time means that it "makes no
sense to make current generations 'pay' for the problems of future
generations. '" 125 In addition, expensive investments in greenhouse-gas
reduction may well diminish available resources for future genera-
tions, leaving them with less "to devote to subsequent damage con-
trol."1 2 6 There is a final point. For many environmental problems,
the irreversible costs of emissions reductions are incurred immediately,
whereas the irreversible costs of emissions will be incurred in the fu-
ture. This difference strengthens public resistance to emissions re-
ductions in a way that fits with standard claims about the need to
discount future effects. 127
The argument for the wait-and-learn approach is strengthened by
these points. But any such argument must also take into account the
123 See, e.g., NoRDHAus & BOYER, supra note 71, at 121-44. This point is not meant to
endorse any particular set of responses to climate change; it is simply meant to suggest that
some such response is justified, in substantial part, because of the risk of irreversible harm.
A good discussion can be found in id. and in RICHARD B. STEWART &JONATHAN B. WIENER,
RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY. BEYOND KYOTO 21 (2003).
124 SeeJagdish N. Bhagwati et al., Expert Panel Ranking, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLU-
TIONS, supra note 71, at 605, 635 (remarks of Vernon L. Smith).
125 Id. at 627 (remarks of Thomas C. Schelling).
126 Id. at 635 (remarks of Vernon L. Smith).
127 For a statement and criticism of the standard claims, see Richard L. Revesz, Environ-
mental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REv.
941 (1999).
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incontrovertible fact that waiting simultaneously threatens to diminish
the flexibility of future decision makers, and perhaps severely. 128
2. Irreversibilities and Distribution
At first glance, an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle
might seem to be especially beneficial to disadvantaged people. 129 In
the context of global warming, aggressive precautions are projected to
give far more to poor countries than to rich ones, partly because rich
nations are so much less dependent on agriculture.130 Nonetheless,
there is no simple connection between distributional goals and an em-
phasis on irreversible harms. Some of the risks associated with ge-
netic engineering are irreversible,13 1 but as we have seen, the benefits
of genetic engineering are likely to be felt most in poor nations.1 32
The analysis of distributional goals must be undertaken separately
from the analysis of irreversibility.
3. Precommitment Value
In some domains, future flexibility is undesirable, and people are
willing to pay a great deal to eliminate it. The tale of Ulysses and the
Sirens is perhaps the most familiar example, 133 and the idea of
precommitment has many legal applications.1 3 4 In the environmental
context, regulators might be willing to pay for precommitment strate-
gies that will operate as a constraint on interest-group power, myopia,
weakness of will, excessively high discount rates, cognitive biases, or
other problems. Indeed, the conventional Precautionary Principle,
understood to place a thumb on the scales in favor of environmental
protection, might be explained in these terms. 135
128 See, e.g., Cline, supra note 122, at 56-57. Cline emphasizes that both the slowness of
political processes and the gradual nature of climate change make it nearly impossible to
make such changes "on a dime." Id. at 56.
129 See generally Juan Almendares, Science, Human Rights, and the Precautionary Principle in
Honduras, in PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AND PREVENTIVE PUBLIC POLICY, supra
note 28, at 55 (discussing advantages to Third World countries offered by the Precaution-
ary Principle).
130 See NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 71, at 161-68.
131 See generally Wesseler, supra note 1, at 214 (discussing the threat of pest resistance as
an irreversible event related to the use of transgenic crops).
132 See THOMAS R. DEGREGORI, BOUNTIFUL HARVEST: TECHNOLOGY, FOOD SAFETY, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 100-06 (2002); GoKLANY, supra note 10, at 48-49.
133 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATION-
ALITY (rev. ed. 1984) (discussing precommitment strategies and self-binding, as in the case
of Ulysses and the Sirens).
134 See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (1995) (emphasizing precommitment strategies in the constitutional domain).
135 See David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1315 (2003).
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The difficulty, for any such explanation, should now be familiar:
Any precommitment strategy may give rise to problems, including en-
vironmental problems, for which a precommitment strategy might
also be justified. It is nonetheless important to see that option value is
sometimes paralleled by "precommitment value," for which regulators
might also be willing to spend a great deal. The literature on options,
and on the need to maintain flexibility, has not yet come to terms with
situations in which flexibility is a problem rather than a solution.
4. Conclusions
There is a coherent and distinctive Irreversible Harm Precaution-
ary Principle, which takes the form of a willingness to pay a premium
to maintain flexibility for the future. In many settings, it makes sense
to pay for an option to avoid a risk of irreversible losses. The amount
of the payment depends on the magnitude of the loss if it is irreversi-
ble. If irreversible losses are on both sides, then it is necessary to as-
sess their likelihood and their magnitude. We can find an implicit
understanding of option value in the emphasis on irreversibility in
NEPA and other federal statutes, along with many international agree-
ments. But because environmental expenditures are typically sunk
costs, an emphasis on irreversibility will sometimes argue in favor of
delaying, rather than accelerating, environmental protection.
Whether it does so depends on the magnitude and likelihood of the
relevant effects.
E. Environmental Injunctions
An understanding of these issues helps to explain some long-
standing disputes about the issuance of preliminary injunctions in en-
vironmental cases. For many years, some courts of appeals,
particularly the Ninth Circuit, held that when a party alleges environ-
mental harm, district courts should adopt a presumption of irrepara-
ble damage and indeed a presumption in favor of injunctive relief.13 6
In NEPA cases, the result was a likely injunction if the agency had
failed to prepare an adequate environmental impact statement: "Ir-
reparable damage is presumed when an agency fails to evaluate thor-
oughly the environmental impact of a proposed action. '1 37 But what
is the basis for this presumption? And what follows from it? Does it
follow, for example, that the United States Navy must be enjoined
from conducting weapons-training operations before it has obtained a
permit to discharge ordnance into the sea?
136 See, e.g., Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985).
137 See Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 1984). For a general
discussion, see ZygmuntJ.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 524 (1982).
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In response to the last question, the Supreme Court said no.' 38
Rejecting the suggestion that environmental violations should give
rise to automatic injunctions, the Court said that an injunction is an
equitable remedy, subject to traditional balancing, and that it would
"not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from estab-
lished principles" permitting district courts to exercise their discre-
tion.' 39 In a subsequent case, involving the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act, the Court underlined the point and ex-
pressly rejected the presumption of irreparable harm in environmen-
tal cases. 140 In the Court's words, "This presumption is contrary to
traditional equitable principles .. ".. 141 Nonetheless, the Court
stressed that environmental problems raise distinct issues because
" [e] nvironmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately rem-
edied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long
duration, i.e., irreparable."'1 42 It follows that if an environmental in-
jury is likely, "the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an
injunction to protect the environment." 143
When courts of appeals spoke in terms of a presumption in favor
of injunctive relief, they might be understood as adopting a version of
the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle-assuming that envi-
ronmental harm is irreversible in the relevant sense, and requiring a
strong showing by those who seek to proceed in the face of that harm.
This interpretation helps to explain the simplest exception to the
lower courts' presumption: cases in which "irreparable harm to the en-
vironment would result if such relief were granted."' 44 If, for example,
an injunction against the use of a logging road would prevent the re-
moval of diseased trees and thus allow the spread of infection through
national forests, no injunction would issue. 1 45
Here, then, is a clear recognition of the existence of environ-
ment-environment tradeoffs, in a way that requires a qualification of
any Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle. And when the Su-
preme Court rejected the presumption, it did so in favor of traditional
equitable balancing, recognizing that serious harms, and perhaps irre-
versible harms, are on all sides. But even in doing so, the Court en-
dorsed a kind of Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle through
138 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
139 Id. at 313.
140 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544-45 (1987).
141 Id. at 545.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part, vacated
in part, sub nom. Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. 531.
145 Alpine Lakes Prot. Soc'y v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975).
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its explicit recognition that environmental injury "is often permanent
or at least of long duration. 146
What still remains undecided after the Court's decisions in the
1980s is the appropriate judicial posture in the face of violations of
NEPA. 147 The Court's rejection of a presumption in favor of prelimi-
nary injunctions might well be taken to suggest that courts should
rarely issue such injunctions in NEPA cases 14 8-especially, perhaps, in
light of the fact that NEPA is a purely procedural statute, one that
imposes information-gathering duties on agencies without requiring
them to follow a particular course of action.149 If courts cannot forbid
agencies to act as they choose after producing an adequate environ-
mental impact statement, injunctions might seem an odd remedy in
the NEPA setting. But in the most elaborate discussion of the ques-
tion, then-Circuit Judge Breyer suggested that injunctions are often
appropriate in NEPA cases. 150 The discussion endorses an appropri-
ately constrained Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, adapted
to the NEPA setting.151
Judge Breyer did not contend that a presumption in favor of in-
junctive relief would be appropriate for environmental cases in gen-
eral. Instead, he argued that NEPA is meant to prevent a particular
kind of injury, one that should play a central role in the decision
whether to grant an injunction. The purpose of NEPA is to ensure
that officials take environmental considerations into account before
they embark on a course of action. 152 Judge Breyer writes, "' [W] hen a
decision to which NEPA obligations attach is made without the in-
formed environmental consideration that NEPA requires, the harm
that NEPA intends to prevent has been suffered.' ' ' 15 3 That harm is
the increased risk of irreparable damage to the environment that
arises "when governmental decisionmakers make up their minds with-
146 Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. at 545.
147 For a general discussion, see Leslye A. Herrmann, Comment, Injunctions for NEPA
Violations: Balancing the Equalities, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1263 (1992).
148 See, e.g., New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 550 F.2d 745, 754-55 (2d Cir.
1977), superceded on other grounds by statute, FED. R. ClIv. P. 52(a), as recognized in Zervos v.
Verizon New York, Inc., 252 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2001); Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v.
Sec'y of Transp., 508 F.2d 927, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated sub nom. Coleman v. Conser-
vation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc., 423 U.S. 809 (1975); United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, 737 F.
Supp. 277, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Stand Together Against Neighborhood Decay, Inc. v.
Bd. of Estimate, 690 F. Supp. 1192, 1199-1200 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
149 See Sierra Club v Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989).
150 See id. at 503-04.
151 See id. Also in this vein, see Wash. County, N.C. v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 317 F. Supp.
2d 626, 633-37 (E.D.N.C. 2004); Crutchfield v. US. Army Corps ofEng'rs, 192 F. Supp. 2d 444,
455-65 (E.D. Va. 2001).
152 See Sierra Club, 872 F.2d at 503-04.
153 Id. at 500 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952
(1st Cir. 1983)).
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out having before them an analysis (with prior public comment) of
the likely effects of their decision upon the environment."1 54
Irreversibility is central here, for it is simply the case that adminis-
trators are less likely to destroy a nearly completed project than one
that has only started. The relevant harm "may well have to do with the
psychology of decisionmakers, and perhaps a more deeply rooted
human psychological instinct not to tear down projects once they are
built."155 Judge Breyer's point, then, is that "the district court should
take account of the potentially irreparable nature of this decisionmak-
ing risk to the environment when considering a request for prelimi-
nary injunction." 156
None of this means that in NEPA cases, preliminary injunctions
should issue as a matter of course; that view would endorse the Irre-
versible Harm Precautionary Principle in its crudest form. Sometimes
injunctions will themselves impose serious harm, and sometimes the
risk to the environment is trivial. 157 But in NEPA cases, it makes sense
to consider, as a relevant factor, the risk that an inadequately in-
formed decision to proceed will alter the status quo, ensuring that
once an environmental impact statement is produced, it will be too
late to have a meaningful effect on the outcome. If delay is not ex-
ceedingly costly, and if the risk of environmental harm is serious, in-
junctive relief is appropriate for NEPA violations. An understanding
of the risk of irreversibility helps to explain why.
III
ON CATASTROPHES AND WORST-CASE SCENARIOS
On one understanding of irreversibility, the real problem is seri-
ousness: A loss of a species, or of a pristine area, is far worse if the loss
is permanent. Many international treaties focus on serious and, in
particular, catastrophic harm. 158 The line between a noncatastrophic
and a catastrophic harm rests on the magnitude of the adverse effects.
For present purposes, let us simply understand a catastrophic harm to
involve a large number of human deaths-not thousands, but at least
hundreds of thousands, or perhaps millions.159
154 Id.
155 Id. at 504.
156 Id. at 501.
157 See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
158 See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpil-
ing and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 103-21, 1975 U.N.T.S. 469.
159 A narrower definition, involving threats to the survival of the human race, is
adopted in POSNER, supra note 3, at 6.
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A. Against Catastrophic Risk 1: A Modest Principle
Environmental regulation is often concerned with low probability
events having especially bad worst-case scenarios. The standard ap-
proach to risk regulation fully supports that concern. To see why,
consider three stylized environmental problems, creating three quite
different sorts of risks: (a) The first problem creates a 999,999 in a
million chance that no one will die, and a one in a million chance that
200 million people will die. (b) The second problem creates a 50%
chance that no one will die and a 50% chance that 400 people will die.
(c) The third problem creates a 100% chance that 200 people will die.
Suppose that the government can eliminate all three problems at a
specified cost.
Each of these risks presents an expected loss of 200 lives. If out-
comes and probabilities are simply multiplied, the three problems will
be seen as equivalent. In problem (a), my special concern, it would
be difficult to defend the view that no resources should be devoted to
eliminating the underlying risk. Suppose that a human life is valued
at $6 million. If so, then $1.2 billion should be expended for eliminat-
ing the risk involved in problem (a). And in fact, this is the govern-
ment's current approach to risk reduction. 160 Let us begin, then, with
the most modest kind of Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Princi-
ple-one that favors precautionary steps based on expected value cal-
culations of this sort. Note that under this approach, catastrophes are
not receiving any particular attention. The central point is that they
do not deserve less attention than higher probability harms with
equivalent expected outcomes.
Despite its modesty, this form of the Precautionary Principle has
important uses. In many contexts, human beings treat low-probability
risks as if they were zero, especially if those risks are unlikely to come
to fruition in the near future. 61 And because judgments about
160 See, e.g., National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications
to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7012 (Jan.
22, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141-42). Agencies use a value of a statistical
life (VSL) of about $6 million, independent of the probability that the relevant risk will
come to fruition. For an overview, see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death,
72 U. CHI. L. REv. 537 (2005). In itsJuly 2003 regulation governing food labeling of trans
fatty acids, the Food and Drug Administration used a VSL of $6.5 million. See Food Label-
ing: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health Claims,
68 Fed. Reg. 41,434, 41,489 (July 11, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). In its
March 2003 proposed rule on dietary ingredients and dietary supplements, the same
agency suggested a VSL of $5 million. See Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manu-
facturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary Ingredients and Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg.
12,158, 12,230 (Mar. 13, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 111-12) (using this value to
calculate the "value of a statistical life day").
161 See generally MAX H. BAZERMAN & MICHAEL D. WATKINS, PREDICTABLE SURPRISES: THE
DISASTERS YOU SHOULD HAVE SEEN COMING, AND HOW TO PREvENSr THEM 84-87 (2004)
(discussing "Discounting the Future").
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probability are often driven by the "availability heuristic,"1 62 people
may well treat low-probability risks as if they were zero-probability
risks. By their very nature, low-probability risks are unlikely to be ac-
companied by "available" instances of real-world harm. The impor-
tance of the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle stems from
the fact that when a risk probability is below a certain threshold, peo-
ple often treat the risk as essentially zero, and are willing to pay little
or nothing for insurance in the event of loss. 163 Such responses pro-
vide support for the intuitive suggestion that some risks are simply
"off-screen"-whereas other risks, which are not statistically much
larger, can come "on screen" and produce behavioral changes. The
central idea behind the most modest form of the Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle is that low-probability, high-harm risks should
be treated in accordance with their expected values.
This principle, based on expected value, might well provide more
protection than accords with ordinary intuitions. In order to obtain a
preliminary understanding of those intuitions, I conducted an experi-
ment with 176 law students,16 4 who were asked the following question:
The government is considering two environmental problems. The first
creates a one in one million risk of killing 200 million people, and a
999,999 in one million risk of killing zero people. The second creates a one
in ten risk of killing 2000 people, and a nine in ten risk of killing zero
people. Do you think:
(a) the first problem has higher priority ?
(b) the second problem has higher priority?
(c) the two problems have equal priority ?
A strong plurality of 41% chose (b), whereas 36% chose (c) and
only 22% chose (a). 16 5 In short, far more respondents were risk-seek-
ing than risk-averse in the domain of low-probability catastrophes; for
low-probability risks of disaster, they were willing to take their
chances, at least when the comparison risk involves a higher-
probability risk with an equivalent expected value. Of course, law stu-
162 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11-14 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
163 See Gary H. McClelland et al., Insurance for Low-Probability Hazards: A Bimodal Re-
sponse to Unlikely Events, 7J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95, 108-09 (1993).
164 One hundred and four were at the University of Alabama Law School and seventy-
two were at the University of Chicago Law School.
165 These statistics were substantially the same across the two schools sampled. Nota-
bly, over one-third of respondents in this experiment were risk neutral, perhaps because
law students are taught to attend to expected value-a tendency that would likely be less
pronounced in the general population. It might have been anticipated that University of
Chicago law students would be more inclined to risk neutrality than University of Alabama
law students, because of the prevalence of economic analysis at the former institution, but
the figures were essentially the same: 37.5% of Chicago students were risk neutral, com-
pared to 35.5% of Alabama students.
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dents at particular institutions may not be representative of the popu-
lation as a whole, but it is reasonable to expect that the relatively lower
concern for a low-probability, high-harm risk would be even more pro-
nounced within the general population. If so, attending to expected
value would have significant effects in the case of potentially cata-
strophic harm. To the extent that many people show little concern
about global warming, part of the explanation may well lie in the fact
that human beings often neglect low-probability, high-harm risks, es-
pecially if the costs would be incurred immediately and if the benefits
would not be realized until the distant future. 166
B. Against Catastrophic Risk 2: Expected Value, Prospect
Theory, and (Bounded) Risk Aversion
A Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, emphasizing ex-
pected value, raises several questions. The first is whether a low-
probability risk of catastrophe might not deserve more attention than
higher-probability risks with apparently equivalent expected value.
Perhaps people should be especially attentive to low-probability, high-
consequence hazards. The reason is that it is plausible to think that
the loss of 200 million people is more than 1,000 times worse than the
loss of 2,000 people. Indeed, the former loss might be dramatically
worse than a mere exercise in multiplication might suggest. Consider
the real-world meaning of a loss of 200 million people in the United
States. In that event, the nation would find it extremely hard to re-
cover. Its private and public institutions would be damaged for a long
time, perhaps forever. What kind of governance structure would it
have? What would its economy look like? Future generations would
inevitably suffer. The effect of a catastrophe greatly outruns a simple
multiplication of a certain number of lives lost.
It follows that the overall costs of losing two-thirds of the Ameri-
can population are far more than 100,000 times the costs of losing
2,000 people. Consider in this regard the "Buffalo Creek Syndrome,"
documented several times in the aftermath of major disasters.167
Nearly two years after the collapse of a dam that left 120 people dead
and 4,000 homeless, psychiatric researchers continued to find signifi-
cant psychological and sociological changes; survivors were character-
ized by a loss of direction and energy, other disabling character
changes, and a loss of communality.1 68 One evaluator attributed this
loss of direction specifically to "'the loss of the traditional bonds of
166 See BAZERMAN & WATKINS, supra note 161, at 6.
167 See Daniel J. Fiorino, Technical and Democratic Values in Risk Analysis, 9 RISK ANALYSIS
293, 295 (1989).
168 Id.
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kinship and neighborliness. '11 69 Genuine catastrophes, involving the
loss of millions of people, would magnify that loss to an unimaginable
degree. There is a detailed literature on the "social amplification of
risk," exploring secondary social losses, from one or another event,
that can greatly outrun the initial effect of that event. 170 A Cata-
strophic Harm Precautionary Principle, devoting special attention to
risks with large secondary losses, is well supported by an understand-
ing of social amplification.
In any case (and this is an independent point), a well-known al-
ternative to expected utility theory-prospect theory-predicts risk
aversion in circumstances ofjust this sort.171 It follows that if the ques-
tion is properly framed, people may be willing to devote special prior-
ity to a low-probability risk of catastrophe, with the degree of priority
depending on the degree of risk aversion. 172 Especially in light of the
secondary costs of catastrophe, it might be concluded that whatever
the right figure is, the simple aggregation ($6 million multiplied by
the number of lives lost) produces implausibly low figures when the
question is the death of millions. Perhaps it makes sense to build a
distinctive premium, called "catastrophe aversion," into case (a). This
idea might be used as the basis for a second and more aggressive kind
of Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, embodying that
premium.
This claim might be supported by questioning the use of the $6
million figure for the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL). That figure is a
product of studies of actual workplace risks, attempting to determine
how much workers are paid to assume mortality hazards. 173 The rele-
vant risks usually are in the general range of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000.174
The calculation of VSL is a product of simple arithmetic. Suppose
that workers must be paid $600, on average, to assume a risk of 1/
10,000. If so, the VSL would be said to be $6 million. But if people
are willing to pay $60 to avoid a risk of 100,000, it does not follow that
they would be willing to pay (only) $60 to avoid a risk of 100,000 when
169 Id.; seeJohn D. Robinson, Michael D. Higgins, & P. Kenneth Bolyard, Assessing Envi-
ronmental Impacts on Health: A Role for Behavioral Science, 4 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV.
41, 48-49 (1983).
170 See, e.g., THE SOCIAL AMPLIFICATION OF RISK (Nick Pidgeon et al. eds., 2003).
171 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17, 28-42 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representa-
tion of Uncertainty, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra, at 44, 64-65.
172 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 171, at 64-65.
173 See W. Kip VIscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS 19-20 (1992) (explaining the method by
which the value of a worker's life is estimated).
174 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates With Risks by Occupation and Indus-
try, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 29, 32-33 & tbl.1 (2004) (showing average fatality risks in various
industries between 1992 and 1997 to range from less than 1 in 100,000 (administrative
support occupations) to 26 in 100,000 (mining laborers)).
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that risk might come to fruition for millions of people at the same
time. People might be willing to pay a kind of catastrophe premium,
stemming not from risk aversion, but from a special distaste for risks
of true disaster.
I do not mean to settle the question of monetization here. My
only suggestion is that for a number of reasons, it makes sense to pay
attention to low-probability risks of catastrophe. If so, a Catastrophic
Harm Precautionary Principle is justified. There is a clear implication
for such problems as global warming, genetic modification of food,
nuclear power, and terrorism: In all of these contexts, attention to the
expected value of the harm is warranted, including a premium that
recognizes the secondary effects that result from the magnitude of the
danger. But from the analysis thus far, what is true in the context of
irreversible harms is true for the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle as well. The amount of the premium is bounded, and every-
thing depends on the probability of the risk, its size, and the various
costs associated with reducing or eliminating it.
Thus far, then, the territory is conventional. Attention to ex-
pected value justifies a concern with low-probability risks of real disas-
ter; the degree of attention must be attuned to the distinctive
problems and costs associated with catastrophe. Even if regulators are
risk neutral, they will devote substantial resources to the reduction of
such risks. In view of the high stakes, a degree of risk aversion may
well make sense in this context, complementing a focus on the prob-
lem of irreversibility to suggest, for example, that significant resources
should be devoted to the problems of global warming and depletion
of the ozone layer. 175 On the other hand, it is important to attend to
the environmental and other risks associated with reducing those
problems. 176 An analysis of this kind might be used to specify appro-
priate responses. 177 What I am adding here is that this analysis might
be undertaken under the general framework of a Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle.
175 On the latter problem, see generally RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY
(enlarged ed. 1998) (discussing the role of politics in addressing ozone depletion and
emphasizing the importance of devoting resources to combat further environmental
harm); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 41, at 1046-55 (summarizing the history of ozone deple-
tion and discussing the Montreal Protocol, which was intended to minimize the produc-
tion of substances that deplete the ozone layer).
176 See, e.g., GOKLANY, supra note 10, at 57-88 ("[A]n insurance policy itself might raise
new-or aggravate existing-threats to human health or the environment"); William R.
Cline, Climate Change, in GLOBAL CRSES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, supra note 71, at 13, 15-21
(discussing the problem of discounting future costs and benefits to obtain present values
of policy judgments).
177 See NoRDHAus & BOYER, supra note 71; Cline, supra note 176, at 19-20 (discussing
optimal carbon taxes for reducing climate damage).
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C. Catastrophic Harm, Timing, and Politics
The risk of catastrophe can be immediate, as in the case of terror-
ist attacks, but sometimes it is clear that if a catastrophe will occur, it
will not be until the distant future, as may be the case for global warm-
ing. When the costs of precautions are incurred immediately, and
when the benefits will not be enjoyed until decades later, people are
likely to be extremely averse to precautionary steps, even if they are
justified. Of course, the aversion might make sense if it is based on a
decision to apply the appropriate discount rate to future benefits (a
highly controversial question). 178 But it is easy to imagine situations
in which future harms are being treated as irrelevant, or nearly so,
because of social myopia, wishful thinking,179 or a simple failure of
imagination or empathy with those who will be at risk. For these rea-
sons, there is a particular need for a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle when the risk will not materialize until the distant future.
The point can be fortified with a reference to likely political dy-
namics. If the costs of precautions will be incurred immediately, and
if the benefits will not be enjoyed for many decades, elected officials
will have a strong incentive to delay. The reason is that they will face
political retribution for imposing immediate costs and might well re-
ceive little or no political gain for delivering long-term benefits. In
the case of global warming, the temporal disparity between costs and
benefits creates a strong incentive to delay even if immediate precau-
tions are justified, simply because those who are most likely to benefit
do not vote. 180 This point provides an additional reason to endorse a
Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, one that attempts to over-
come the danger that future risks will receive less attention than they
deserve.
D. Against Catastrophic Risk 3: Uncertainty
Is it possible to support a still more aggressive kind of Cata-
strophic Harm Precautionary Principle? To approach this question, it
is necessary to venture into some technical waters.
In some contexts, environmental and other risk-related problems
involve hazards of ascertainable probability, which has been the as-
sumption of the discussion thus far. It may well be possible to say that
the risk of death from a certain activity is 1/100,000, or at least that it
ranges from (say) 1/20,000 to 1/500,000, with an exposed population
of (say) 10 million. Or it may be possible to say that the risk of cata-
178 For a discussion of the cost-benefit analysis in the environmental context, see
Revesz, supra note 127.
179 See George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive
Dissonance, in GEORGE A. AKERLOF, AN ECONOMIC THEORIST's BOOK OF TALES 123 (1984).
180 See BAZERMAN & WATMNS, supra note 161.
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strophic harm from global warming is under 10% but above 1%.1 81
But as the economist Frank Knight has maintained, it is possible to
imagine instances in which analysts cannot specify even a range of
probability.'l 2 Hence regulators, and ordinary people, are often act-
ing in a situation of uncertainty (where outcomes can be identified
but no probabilities can be assigned) rather than risk (where out-
comes can be identified and probabilities assigned to various out-
comes),183 And they are sometimes acting under conditions of
ignorance, in which they are unable to specify either the probability of
bad outcomes or their nature-where regulators do not even know
the magnitude of the harms that they are facing.' 8 4
When existing knowledge allows regulators to identify outcomes,
but does not permit them to assign probabilities to them, it is some-
times said to be rational to follow the "maximin principle": Choose
the policy with the best worst-case outcome.18 5 In the environmental
context, perhaps elaborate precautions can be justified by reference
to the maximin principle, asking officials to identify the worst case
among the various options, and to select that option whose worst case
is least bad. Perhaps the maximin principle would lead to an excep-
tionally aggressive form of the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Prin-
ciple by, for example, urging elaborate steps to combat global
warming. Suppose that such steps would impose various hardships,
but that even in the worst case, these are not nearly so bad as the worst
cases associated with global warming. It follows that if aggressive mea-
sures are justified to reduce the risks associated with global warming,
one reason is that those risks are potentially catastrophic and existing
science does not enable us to assign probabilities to the worst-case sce-
181 NoIRHAus & BOYER, supra note 71, at 88 (suggesting a 1.2% probability of a cata-
strophic impact with 2.5' Celsius warming and a 6.8% probability with 60 Celsius warming).
182 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 215 (London Sch. of Econ. &
Political Sci. 1948) (1921). This is Posner's view of abrupt global warming. See POSNER,
supra note 3, at 57 (describing abrupt global warming as a case in which "probabilities
cannot be assigned to particular outcomes").
183 See KNIGHT, supra note 182, at 197-232; Paul Davidson, Is Probability Theory Relevant
for Uncertainty? A Post-Keynesian Perspective, J. EcON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 129. Some peo-
ple object that uncertainty does not exist because it is always possible for decision-makers
to produce probability assignments by proposing a series of lotteries over possible out-
comes; but such assignments have no epistemic credentials if not rooted in either theory or
repeated experiences, and many risk-related problems, such as those involving global
warming, are in that category. I take up this point in detail below.
184 On ignorance and precaution, see P. Harremolhs, Ethical Aspects of Scientific Incerti-
tude in Environmental Analysis and Decision Making, 11 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 705 (2003).
185 For a technical treatment of the possible rationality of maximin, see Kenneth J.
Arrow & Leonid Hurwicz, An Optimality Criterion for Decision-Making Under Ignorance, in UN-
CERTAINTY AND EXPECTATIONS IN ECONOMICS 1 (C.F. Carter &J.L. Ford eds., 1972); for a
non-technical overview, seeJoN ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE app. 1, at 185-207
(1983).
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narios.' 86 The same analysis might be applied to many problems, in-
cluding the risks associated with nuclear energy18 7 and terrorism.
E. Against Worst-Case Analysis
To understand these claims, we need to back up a bit and investi-
gate maximin in more detail. Does it generally make sense to eliminate
the worst-case scenario? Put the question of uncertainty to one side
and begin with a numerical example that involves risk instead; which
would you prefer:
(a) a 99.9% chance of gaining $2,000, and a 0.1 % chance of losing $6?
(b) a 50% chance of gaining $5, and a 50% chance of losing $5?
Under maximin, (b) is preferable-but under standard accounts
of rationality, it would be much more sensible to select (a), which has
a far higher expected value. To choose (b), one would have to show
an extraordinary degree of risk aversion.
Now turn to a mundane illustration of the kinds of decisions in
which maximin might seem attractive: A reporter living in Los Angeles
has been told that he can take one of two assignments. First, he can
go to a nation, say Iraq, that is facing a large amount of terrorism.
Second, he can go to Paris to cover anti-American sentiment in
France. The Iraq assignment has, in his view, two polar outcomes: (a)
He might have the most interesting and rewarding experience of his
professional life, or (b) he might be killed. The Paris assignment has
two polar outcomes of its own: (a) He might have an interesting expe-
rience, one that is also a great deal of fun, or (b) he might be lonely
and homesick. It might seem tempting for the reporter to choose
Paris on the ground that the worst-case scenario for that choice is so
much better than the worst-case scenario for Iraq. And if this is cor-
rect, the conclusion might bear on regulatory policy when one or an-
other approach has an identifiably worse worst-case scenario.188
But maximin is not always a sensible decision rule. Suppose that
the reporter now has the choice of staying in Los Angeles or going to
Paris; suppose, too, that on personal and professional grounds, Paris is
far better. It would make little sense for him to invoke maximin in
order to stay in Los Angeles on the ground that the plane to Paris
might crash. A plane crash is, of course, extremely unlikely, but it
cannot be ruled out. Using an example of this kind, John Harsanyi
186 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 49.
187 See ELSTER, supra note 185, app. 1, at 188-205 (discussing risk models for choosing
various types of energy, including nuclear energy).
188 See id.; Richard T. Woodward & Richard C. Bishop, How to Decide When Experts Disa-
gree: Uncertainty-Based Choice Rules in Environmental Policy, 73 LAND ECONOMICS 492 (1997);
cf POSNER, supra note 3, at 43-58 (emphasizing the possibility of catastrophe from abrupt
global warming).
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contends that maximin should be rejected on the ground that it pro-
duces irrationality, even madness:
If you took the maximin principle seriously then you could not ever
cross a street (after all, you might be hit by a car); you could never
drive over a bridge (after all, it might collapse); you could never get
married (after all, it might end in a disaster), etc. If anybody really
acted this way he would soon end up in a mental institution.1 89
Harsanyi's argument might also be invoked to contest the use of
maximin in the choice between Iraq and Paris. Perhaps the reporter
should attempt to specify the likelihood of being killed in Iraq, rather
than simply identifying the worst-case scenario. Perhaps maximin is a
way of neglecting probability and hence a form of irrationality. In
some circumstances, people do display probability neglect in a way
that ensures attention to the worst-case scenario. 190 But if probabili-
ties can actually be assessed, and if that scenario is extremely unlikely
to come to fruition, probability neglect is hard to defend even for
people who are exceptionally risk averse. Suppose that the risk of
death in Iraq turns out to be 1/1,000,000, and that the choice of Iraq
would be much better, personally and professionally, than the choice
of Paris. It is necessary to know something about the reporter's values
and tastes to understand how to resolve this problem, but it is cer-
tainly plausible to think that the reporter should choose Iraq rather
than make the decision by obsessively fixating on the worst that might
happen. Recall that the Council on Environmental Quality no longer
requires worst-case analysis; it refuses to do so on the ground that ex-
tremely speculative and improbable outcomes do not deserve atten-
tion.191 So far, then, Harsanyi's criticism of maximin seems to stand
on firm ground.
But something important is missing from Harsanyi's argument
and even from the reporter's analysis of the choice between Los Ange-
les and Paris: Risks, and equally bad worst-case scenarios, are on all
sides of the hypothesized situations. If the reporter stayed in Los An-
geles, he might be killed in one way or another, and hence the use of
maximin does not by itself justify the decision to stay in the United
States. And contrary to Harsanyi's argument, maximin does not really
mean that people should not cross streets, drive over bridges, and re-
fuse to marry. The reason is that failing to do those three things has
worst-case scenarios of its own (including death and disaster). To im-
189 SeeJohn C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique
of John Rawls's Theory, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 594, 595 (1975).
190 See Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112
YALE L.J. 61, 62-63 (2002).
191 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text; PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 41, at
848-49.
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plement maximin, or an injunction to take precautions, it is necessary
to identify all relevant risks, not a subset. Harsanyi errs in the same
way as those who embrace the strong version of the Precautionary
Principle-by neglecting the possibility that precautions against one
set of risks will create risks of their own. Alternative decisions may
lead to worst-case scenarios that are very bad and even equally bad. A
Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, attempting to eliminate
the worst cases, might produce nightmarish scenarios, too.
Nonetheless, the more general objection to maximin holds under
circumstances of risk. If probabilities can be assigned to the various
outcomes, it does not make sense to follow maximin when the worst
case is highly improbable and when the alternative option is both
much better and much more likely. Of course, many people are risk
averse, or averse to particular risks. But when probabilities can be as-
signed, maximin seems to require infinite risk aversion. 192 It follows
that the reporter would do well to reject maximin and to go to Paris,
even if the worst-case scenario for Paris is worse than that for Los An-
geles, if the realistically likely outcomes are so much better in Paris.
These points are not meant to suggest that in order to be rational, the
reporter must calculate expected values, multiplying imaginable out-
comes by probability and deciding accordingly. Life is short, people
are busy and occasionally risk averse, and it is far from irrational to
create a margin of safety to protect against disaster. But if the likeli-
hood of a bad outcome is extremely small, and if much is to be gained
by deciding in accordance with expected values, maximin is foolish.
For environmental policy, the implication is clear. A Cata-
strophic Harm Precautionary Principle makes sense if it emphasizes
expected value; it may even make sense if it embodies a form of risk
aversion. But it does not make sense, as a general rule, to identify the
worst-case scenario and to attempt to eliminate it. But the problem of
uncertainty raises distinctive questions.
F. Maximin and Uncertainty
1. Precautions, Uncertainty, and Worst-Case Scenarios
I have suggested that maximin has sometimes been recom-
mended under circumstances of uncertainty rather than risk.193 In an
illuminating effort to recast the Precautionary Principle, 194 Stephen
Gardiner invokes John Rawls's argument for maximin in the context
of distributive justice. 195 Rawls argues that when "grave risks" are in-
192 See R.A. Musgrave, Maximin, Uncertainty, and the Leisure Trade-Off 88 Q.J. ECON. 625,
626-27 (1974).
193 See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 185, app. 1, at 188-205.
194 See Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precautionary Principle, 14J. POL. PHIL. 33 (2006).
195 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 132-39 (rev. ed. 1999).
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volved, and when probabilities cannot be assigned to the occurrence
of those risks, maximin is the appropriate decision rule, at least if the
chooser "cares very little, if anything, for what he might gain above the
minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be sure of by following the max-
imin rule." 196 Rawls contends, then, that maximin is justified (a) in
the face of potentially catastrophic outcomes, (b) when probabilities
cannot be assigned, and (c) when the loss from following maximin is a
matter of relative indifference. 197 Gardiner argues that this argument
forms the basis for a "core" Precautionary Principle in the environ-
mental setting: When the three conditions are met, precautions-in
the form of efforts to avoid the worst-case scenario-should be
adopted. 19 8
Gardiner adds, sensibly, that to justify maximin, the threats that
are potentially catastrophic must satisfy some minimal threshold of
plausibility. If they can be dismissed as unrealistic, then maximin
should not be followed. 199 Gardiner believes that the problem of
global warming can be usefully analyzed in these terms and that it
presents a good case for the application of maximin. 20 0 In a similar
vein, Jon Elster, speaking of nuclear power, contends that maximin is
the appropriate choice when it is possible to identify the worst-case
scenario and when the alternatives have the same best conse-
quences. 20 1 Here, then, is the basic argument in favor of the most
aggressive form of the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle-a
principle that calls on regulators, under circumstances of uncertainty,
to identify and eliminate the worst-case scenario. Taken seriously, this
principle would have large consequences for regulatory policy, at least
if conditions of uncertainty are common.
2. Objection 1: The Argument Is Trivial
An initial problem with this argument is that it risks triviality,
above all because of condition (c).202 If individuals and societies can
eliminate an uncertain danger of catastrophe for essentially no cost,
196 Id. at 134.
197 See id. at 134-35. Rawls draws in turn on WILLIAM FELLNER, PROBABILITY AND PROFIT
140-42 (1965). Id. at 134 n.20. He offers a somewhat revised defense of maximin in John
Rawls, Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 141, 141 (1974).
198 See Gardiner, supra note 194, at 45-49.
199 See id. at 51.
200 See id. at 55.
201 See ELSTER, supra note 185, app. 1, at 203.
202 Cf David Kelsey, Choice Under Partial Uncertainty, 34 INT'L ECON. REv. 297, 305
(1993) ("It is often argued that lexicographic decision rules such as maximin are irra-
tional, since in economics we would not expect an individual to be prepared to make a
small improvement in one of his objectives at the expense of large sacrifices in all of his
other objectives. This criticism is less powerful in the current context since we have as-
sumed that the decision maker has a weak order rather than a cardinal utility function on
the space of outcomes. Given this assumption the terms 'large' and 'small' used in the
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then of course they should eliminate that risk. If people are asked to
pay $1 to avoid a potentially catastrophic risk to which probabilities
cannot be assigned, they might as well pay $1. And if two options have
the same best-case scenario, and if the first has a far better worst-case
scenario, people should of course choose the first option.
There is nothing wrong with this argument, but the real world
rarely presents problems of this form. When policy and law are dis-
puted, the elimination of uncertain dangers of catastrophe imposes
both costs and risks. In the context of global warming, for example, it
is implausible to say that regulatory decision makers can or should
care "very little, if anything," for what might be lost by following max-
imin. If nations followed maximin for global warming, they would
spend a great deal to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. 203 The result
would almost certainly be higher prices for gasoline and energy, prob-
ably producing increases in unemployment and poverty. A study
done at the Wharton School, for example, projected extremely high
costs for the United States from the Kyoto Protocol-including a loss
of 2.4 million jobs and $300 billion in the nation's GDP, with an aver-
age annual cost of $2,700 per household, a 65¢ per gallon increase in
the price of gasoline, and a near doubling of the price of energy and
electricity. 20 4 Even if these figures are wildly inflated, as seems likely,
any significant effort to curtail global warming would impose signifi-
cant hardships, especially on poor people, who are least able to bear
the relevant cost increases. Something similar can be said about ge-
netic modification of food, because elimination of the worst-case sce-
nario, through aggressive regulation, might well eliminate an
inexpensive source of nutrition that would have exceptionally valuable
effects on countless people who live under circumstances of extreme
deprivation. 20 5
The real question, then, is whether regulators should embrace
maximin in real-world cases in which doing so is extremely costly. If
they should, it is because condition (c) is too stringent and should be
abandoned. Even if the costs of following maximin are significant,
and even if regulators care a great deal about incurring those costs,
the question is whether it makes sense to follow maximin when they
face uncertain dangers of catastrophe. In the environmental context,
above argument are not meaningful."). In many environmental choices, however, decision
makers do have a cardinal utility function, not merely a weak order.
203 See NOROHAUS & BOYER, supra note 71, at 167-68.
204 WHARTON ECONOMETRIC FoRECASTINc ASSOCIATES, GLOBAL WARMING: THE HIGH
CosTs OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 2-3 (1998), available at http://api-ec.api.org/filelibrary/nt
198.pdf.
205 See Anderson & Nielsen, supra note 49, at 7-8.
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some people have so claimed.20 6 This claim takes us directly to the
next objection to maximin.
3. Objection 2: Maximin Assumes Infinite Risk Aversion
Rawls's arguments in favor of adopting maximin for purposes of
distributive justice were subject to withering critiques from econo-
mists. The central challenge was that the maximin principle would be
chosen by those maximizing expected utility only if they showed infi-
nite risk aversion.20 7 In the words of one of Rawls's most influential
critics, infinite risk aversion "is unlikely. Even though the stakes are
great, people may well wish to trade a reduction in the assured floor
against the provision of larger gains. But if risk aversion is less than
infinite, the outcome will not be maximin."208 To adapt this objection
to the environmental context, it is plausible to assume a bounded de-
gree of risk aversion with respect to catastrophic harms to support
some modest forms of the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Princi-
ple. But even under circumstances of uncertainty-the argument
goes-maximin is senseless unless societies are to show infinite risk
aversion.
This is a standard challenge, but it is wrong because maximin
does not assume infinite risk aversion. 20 9 Suppose that people are in
circumstances of genuine uncertainty, also known as Knightian uncer-
tainty, in which probabilities cannot plausibly be assigned to various
outcomes.210 The objection that maximin assumes infinite risk aver-
sion depends on a denial that uncertainty exists; it assumes that sub-
jective choices will be made and that they will reveal subjective
probabilities. It is true that subjective choices will be made. But such
choices do not establish that objective uncertainty does not exist. To
see why, it is necessary to engage that question directly.
4. Objection 3: Uncertainty Does Not Exist
Many economists have denied the existence of uncertainty.
Milton Friedman, for example, writes of the risk-uncertainty distinc-
tion, "I have not referred to this distinction because I do not believe it
is valid. I follow L. J. Savage in his view of personal probability, which
denies any valid distinction along these lines. We may treat people as
206 See Woodward & Bishop, supra note 188, at 505-06.
207 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory ofJustice,
70J. PHIL. 245 (1973); Harsanyi, supra note 189; Musgrave, supra note 192.
208 Musgrave, supra note 192, at 627.
209 See C.Y. Cyrus Chu & Wen-Fang Liu, A Dynamic Characterization of Rawls's Maximin
Principle: Theory and Implications, 12 CONST. POL. ECON. 255, 268 (2001).
210 See id. at 264-65.
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if they assigned numerical probabilities to every conceivable event."21'
Friedman and other skeptics are correct to insist that people's choices
suggest that they assign probabilities to events. On a widespread view,
an understanding of people's choices can be taken as evidence of sub-
jective probabilities. People's decisions about whether to fly or in-
stead to drive, whether to walk in certain neighborhoods at night, and
whether to take riskyjobs can be understood as an implicit assignment
of probabilities to events. Indeed, regulators themselves make deci-
sions-including decisions about global warming-from which subjec-
tive probabilities can be calculated. 212 But none of this makes for a
good objection to Knight, who was concerned with objective
probabilities rather than subjective choices.213 Animals, no less than
human beings, make choices from which subjective probabilities can
be assigned. But the existence of subjective probabilities-from dogs,
horses, and elephants-does not mean that animals do not ever face
genuine uncertainty.
Suppose that the question is the likelihood that at least 100 mil-
lion human beings will be alive in 10,000 years. For most people,
equipped with the knowledge that they have, no probability can sensi-
bly be assigned. But perhaps uncertainty is not unbounded; the likeli-
hood can reasonably be described as above 0% and below 100%. But
beyond that point, there is little to say. Or suppose that I present you
with an urn containing 250 balls and ask you to pick one; if you pick a
blue ball, you receive $1,000, but if you pick a green ball, you have to
pay me $1,000. Suppose that I refuse to disclose the proportion of
blue and green balls in the urn-or suppose that the proportion has
211 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 282 (1976); see a/soJACK HiRSHLEIFER &JOHN
G. RILEY, THE ANALYrICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 10 (1992) ("In this book we
disregard Knight's distinction, which has proved to be a sterile one. For our purposes risk
and uncertainty mean the same thing. It does not matter, we contend, whether an 'objec-
tive' classification is or is not possible. For, we will be dealing throughout with a 'subjec-
tive' probability concept (as developed especially by Savage, 1954): probability is simply
degree of belief . . . [Because we never know true objective probabilities, d]ecision-makers
are.., never in Knight's world of risk but instead always in his world of uncertainty. That
the alternative approach, assigning probabilities on the basis of subjective degree of belief,
is a workable and fruitful procedure will be shown constructively throughout this book.").
For the purposes of the analysis by Hirshleifer and Riley, the assignment of subjective
probabilities may well be the best approach. But the distinction between risk and uncer-
tainty is not sterile when regulators are considering what to do and lack information about
the probabilities associated with various outcomes.
212 Cf POSNER, supra note 3, at 176-84 (discussing inverse cost-benefit analysis as a way
to suggest the subjective probabilities of regulators).
213 See Stephen F. LeRoy & Larry D. Singell, Jr., Knight on Risk and Uncertainty, 95 J.
POL. ECON. 394 (1987) (arguing, against many critics, that Knight's work supported the
idea of subjective probabilities). For a clear explanation of why uncertainty exists, see EL-
STER, supra note 185, app. 1, at 193-99 ("One could certainly elicit from a political scientist
the subjective probability that he attaches to the prediction that Norway in the year 3000
will be a democracy rather than a dictatorship, but would anyone even contemplate acting
on the basis of this numerical magnitude?").
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been determined by a computer, which has been programmed by
someone that neither you nor I know. These examples suggest that it
is wrong to deny the possible existence of uncertainty, signaled by the
absence of objective probabilities.2 14
For Friedman and other skeptics about uncertainty, there is an
additional problem. When necessary, human beings do assign subjec-
tive probabilities to future events. But the assignment is a function of
how the situation is described, and formally identical descriptions can
produce radically different judgments. There is every reason to be-
lieve, for example, that people will not give the same answer to the
question, "What is the likelihood that 80% of people will suffer an
adverse effect from a certain risk?" and to the question, "What is the
likelihood that 20% of people will not suffer an adverse effect from a
certain risk?"'2 15 The merely semantic reframing will almost certainly
affect probability judgments. In any case, probability judgments are
notoriously unreliable because they are frequently based on heuristics
and biases that lead to severe and systematic errors.21 6 Suppose that
subjective probability estimates are rooted in the availability heuristic,
leading people to exaggerate risks for which examples readily come to
mind ("availability bias") and also to underestimate risks for which
examples are cognitively unavailable ("unavailability bias"),217 Why
should regulators believe that subjective estimates, subject as they are
to framing, heuristics, and biases, have any standing in the face of the
objective difficulty or impossibility of making probability judgments?
Suppose that Judge Posner is correct to believe that with respect to
global warming, it is objectively impossible to assign a probability to
the risk of catastrophic harm.218 Even if individuals and governments
assign subjective probabilities, do their assignments bear on what
ought to be done?
Writing in 1921, Keynes, often taken to be a critic of the idea of
uncertainty, clearly saw the distinction between objective probabilities
and actual behavior: "The sense in which I am using the term ['uncer-
tain' knowledge] is that in which the prospect of a European war is
uncertain . . . . About these matters there is no scientific basis on
which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not
214 See ELSTER, supra note 185, app. 1, at 195-99.
215 See id. app. 1, at 198-99.
216 For a good overview of this topic, see JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING
125-47 (3d ed. 2000). Elster briefly notes how this point relates to the debate over uncer-
tainty: "There are too many well-known mechanisms that distort our judgment, from wish-
ful thinking to rigid cognitive structures, for us to be able to attach much weight to the
numerical magnitudes that can be elicited by the standard method of asking subjects to
choose between hypothetical options." ELSTER, supra note 185, app. 1, at 199.
217 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REv. 683, 705-07 (1999); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 162, at 11-14.
218 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 49.
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know."2 1 9 This is so even if, as Keynes immediately added, we act "ex-
actly as we should if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation
of a series of prospective advantages and disadvantages, each multi-
plied by its appropriate probability, waiting to be summed." 220 Even if
subjective expected utilities can be assigned on the basis of behavior,
regulators (like everyone else) may well be operating in circumstances
of genuine uncertainty.
5. Objection 4: Uncertainty Is Too Infrequent to Be a Genuine Source
of Concern for Purposes of Policy and Law
Perhaps environmental problems rarely involve genuine uncer-
tainty. Perhaps regulators are usually able to assign probabilities to
outcomes; and where they cannot, perhaps they can instead assign
probabilities to probabilities (or if even this proves impossible,
probabilities to probabilities of probabilities). In many cases, regula-
tors might be able to specify a range of probabilities saying, for exam-
ple, that the probability of catastrophic outcomes from global
warming is above 2% but below 30%.221 Many scientists and econo-
mists believe that global warming is not likely to create catastrophic
harm and that the real costs-human and economic-will be high but
not intolerable. In their view, the worst-case scenarios can be respon-
sibly described as improbable. 2 22
Perhaps we can agree that pure uncertainty is rare. Perhaps we
can agree that at worst, environmental problems involve problems of
"bounded uncertainty," in which we cannot assign probabilities within
specified bands. It is possible to think, for example, that the risk of a
catastrophic outcome is above 1% but below 10%, without being able
to assign probabilities within that band. The pervasiveness of uncer-
tainty depends on what is actually known. As I have emphasized,
Judge Posner believes that "no probabilities can be attached to the
catastrophic global-warming scenarios, and without an estimate of
probabilities an expected cost cannot be calculated."2 23 Note in this
regard that a 1994 survey of experts showed an extraordinary range of
estimated losses from global warming, varying from no economic loss
to a 21% decrease in gross world product.224 This finding, it has been
suggested, is enough to support the view that uncertainty is real and
219 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 51 QJ. OF ECON. 209, 213-14 (1937).
220 Id.
221 See, e.g., supra note 181.
222 See NoDHAus & BOYER, supra note 71, at 96; Mendelsohn, supra note 71, at 45. But
see Cline, supra note 176, at 14-15.
223 POSNER, supra note 3, at 49-50.
224 See William D. Nordhaus, Expert Opinion on Climatic Change, 82 AM. SCIENTIsT 45, 47
(1994).
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must be taken seriously in environmental policy. 225 In my view, uncer-
tainty is both real and rare in the environmental domain; but this is an
empirical judgment, and it may be wrong.
6. On Maximin, Rationality, and Genuine Uncertainty
Now turn to the most difficult question: What is the appropriate
approach to genuine uncertainty? Is maximin a rational strategy? I
begin with some points about actual behavior and then turn to norma-
tive issues.
a. Actual Decisions
As a descriptive matter, it is clear that people sometimes show a
degree of uncertainty aversion, in the sense that they will avoid gam-
bles to which probabilities are not assigned. The relevant work was
done by Daniel Ellsberg.226 Assume that people are asked to choose
among two lotteries, each involving an urn with 100 balls. All of the
balls are either black or red. For the first lottery, the urn contains an
equal division of black and red balls. For the second lottery, the urn
contains an unknown proportion of black balls and red balls. People
receive a specified amount of money for correctly guessing the color
of balls randomly chosen from the urn. It turns out that most people
prefer the first lottery to the second, and thus display aversion to un-
certainty.227 On the assumption of uncertainty aversion, it might be
possible to defend maximin as a decision rule. 228
Note, however, that uncertainty aversion is bounded. So long as
uncertainty aversion is not infinite, maximin will not always be the
preferred decision rule. And indeed, it is reasonable to think that
most people will reject maximin if the question is properly framed.
To test this possibility, I gave seventy-one University of Chicago law
students the following question:
The government is considering two environmental problems. For the
first, the government is able to estimate the probability that a bad outcome
will occur. It believes that there is a 90 % chance that 600 people will die
(and the death of 600 people is the worst-case scenario). It also believes that
there is a 10% chance that 400 people will die. For the second problem, the
government cannot assign probabilities to the various outcomes. The "worst-
case scenario" is that 700 people will die.
Do you think:
225 See Woodward & Bishop, supra note 188. To be sure, experts' views converge more
now than they did in 1994. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 41, at 1057-60.
226 See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643, 650-56
(1961).
227 See id.
228 See Chu & Liu, supra note 209, at 264-66; Woodward & Bishop, supra note 188, at
496-98.
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(a) the first problem has higher priority ?
(b) the second problem has higher priority?
(c) the two problems have equal priority ?
No fewer than 63% chose option (a), with the remainder equally
divided between options (b) and (c). As noted above, law students at
any particular institution may offer idiosyncratic responses to such
questions; but within the general population, it is reasonable to con-
jecture that most people will show no consistent preference for max-
imin, and that they will reject an approach that eliminates the worst
worst-case scenario under circumstances of uncertainty in favor of an
approach that eliminates a highly probable but somewhat less bad
worst-case scenario.22 9
Why is this? The Principle of Insufficient Reason says that when
people lack information about probabilities (say, 1% to 40%), they
should act as if each probability is equally likely.230 Whatever its nor-
mative status, 23 1 actual decisions may well use that principle, which fits
well with the results in the experiment just described. Consider an-
other experiment with a larger group of law students from two institu-
tions (the University of Alabama and the University of Chicago) :232
One thousand people are at risk from an environmental hazard. (a) If
one approach is taken, a minimum of 400 people will die, and a maximum
of 500 people will die. Regulators are unable to assign probabilities to the
various outcomes. (b) If another approach is taken, a minimum of 10 people
will die, and a maximum of 600 people will die. Regulators are unable to
assign probabilities to the various outcomes. Which approach should be
chosen?
(a) The first approach
(b) The second approach
No less than 85.5% of respondents rejected maximin and chose
(b). Why did (b) seem better to so many respondents? On a reasona-
ble interpretation, people begin by presuming at least roughly equal
probabilities under circumstances of uncertainty, and conclude that
they would much rather go the route that has a much higher expected
value, given that presumption. This interpretation is supported by the
results of the following experiment, which asks people to compare a
choice under risk with a choice under uncertainty:2 33
229 See supra note 165.
230 See R. DUNCAN LUCE & HowARD RAFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 284 (1957).
231 See id.; Isaac Levi, On Indeterminate Probabilities, 71 J. PHIL. 391 (1974).
232 The study surveyed one hundred and seventy-three law students; seventy-one were
from the University of Chicago, and one hundred and two were from the University of
Alabama. Interestingly, the answers from the two groups were essentially identical.
233 This experiment was limited to seventy-one law students from the University of
Chicago.
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The government is considering two environmental problems. For the
first, the government is able to estimate the probability that a bad outcome
will occur. It believes that there is a 60% chance that 500-600 people will
die (and the death of 600 people is the worst-case scenario). It also believes
that there is a 40% chance that 200-400 people will die. For the second
problem, the government cannot assign probabilities to the various outcomes.
The worst-case scenario is that 700 people will die.
Do you think:
(a) the first problem has higher priority ?
(b) the second problem has higher priority?
(c) the two problems have equal priority ?
For this problem, maximin was also rejected by a majority of re-
spondents, but here the margin was much smaller: 52% favored (a),
25% were undecided, and 22% favored (b). The rejection of max-
imin is the most striking result here, and it is not entirely clear why the
choice seemed relatively difficult. But the Principle of Insufficient
Reason is consistent with that difficulty. Under the second problem,
the expected number of deaths is 350 if equal probabilities are as-
signed, a number that is close to the expected number of deaths for
the first problem; with a small degree of risk aversion, the choice be-
tween the two problems becomes extremely difficult.
To see the role of the Principle of Insufficient Reason, suppose
that people are asked to choose between
(a) a 99.5% chance of a loss of 200 lives, and a 0.5% chance of a loss of 2
lives, with
(b) an uncertain chance of losing between 2 lives and 205 lives.
For most people, it is reasonable to suppose that (a) is much
worse than (b)-and hence that (b) will be the overwhelming choice.
Here, then, people will make a choice that allows the worst-case scena-
rio. But compare
(a) a risk of 60% of a loss of 200 lives, and 40% of 2 lives, with
(b) an uncertain chance of losing between 205 lives and 2 lives.
For most people, the choice here is much less clear, and it is
likely that many people will choose (a) and thus follow maximin. It
follows that people would have a great deal of difficulty in choosing
between a 51% risk of a loss of 200 lives, and a 49% chance of a loss of
1 life, as compared with an uncertain risk that threatens to produce
losses of between 201 and 1 lives, with no possibility of assigning
probabilities to the various possibilities.
The precise role of the Principle of Insufficient Reason and the
nature of people's choices under circumstances of uncertainty remain
to be established. The discussion thus far should be enough to show
that people will often reject maximin and that the Principle of Insuffi-
cient Reason is a starting point for their intuitions. The implication
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for environmental protection and for other problems involving safety
and health is clear. People will not consistently follow maximin under
circumstances of uncertainty. If the worst-case scenario is extremely
vivid and if it is drawn to their attention, they might neglect the issue
of probability and attempt to eliminate it.23 4 But under ordinary cir-
cumstances, they will select maximin only when the Principle of Insuf-
ficient Reason, accompanied by a degree of risk aversion, suggests that
they should.
b. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Maximin?
A great deal of work explores the question of whether people
should follow maximin under circumstances of uncertainty. 23 5 Some
of this work draws on people's intuitions in a way that illuminates ac-
tual beliefs but tells us little about what rationality requires. 236 Those
intuitions (of the sort described by the experiments above) may be
based on some kind of confusion. Other work is highly formal, adopt-
ing certain axioms and seeing whether maximin violates them.23 7 The
results of this work are not conclusive. Certainly maximin has not
been ruled out as a candidate for rational choice under uncertainty.
I cannot resolve these difficult issues here, but will rest content
with a general suggestion. In deciding whether to follow maximin in
the environmental context, a great deal should turn on two questions:
(a) How bad is the worst-case scenario, compared to other bad out-
comes? (b) What, exactly, is lost by choosing maximin? Of course, it
is possible that decision makers, including regulators, will lack the in-
formation that would enable them to answer these questions. But in
the regulatory context, answers to both (a) and (b) may well be possi-
ble even if it is not possible to assign probabilities to the various out-
comes with any confidence. By emphasizing the relative badness of
the worst-case scenario and the extent of the loss from attending to
that scenario, I am attempting to build on the Rawls/Gardiner sugges-
tion that maximin is the preferred decision rule when little is lost
from following it.238 I have objected that this suggestion threatens to
trivialize the case for maximin;23 9 but it is possible to develop the un-
derlying intuition into a far more general and useful method for ori-
enting both private and public choice.
234 See Sunstein, supra note 190, at 62-63; Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability
Neglect, 26J. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 121 (2003).
235 See, e.g., Arrow & Hurwicz, supra note 185 (suggesting the rationality of either max-
imin or maximax (maximizing the best-case scenario)).
236 See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITI-
ANISM AND BEYOND 39 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
237 See, e.g., LuGE & RAFFA, supra note 230, at 286-97.
238 See supra Part III.F.1.
239 See supra Part III.F.2.
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To see the relevance of the two questions, suppose that you are
choosing between two options. The first has a best-case outcome of 10
and a worst-case outcome of -5. The second has a best-case outcome
of 15 and a worst-case outcome of -6. It is impossible to assign
probabilities to the various outcomes. Maximin would favor the first
option, to avoid the worse worst-case; but to justify that choice, we
have to know something about the meaning of the differences be-
tween 10 and 15 on the one hand and -5 and -6 on the other. If 15 is
much better than 10, and if the difference between -5 and -6 is a
matter of relative indifference, then the choice of the first option is
hardly mandated. But if the difference between -5 and -6 greatly
matters-if it is a matter of life and death-then maximin is much
more attractive.
These points have the important implication of suggesting the
possibility of a (rough) cost-benefit analysis of maximin under condi-
tions of uncertainty. Sometimes a rejection of maximin is compelled
by that analysis because the worst-case scenario is not much worse
than the second worst-case scenario (and hence the benefits of max-
imin are low), and because we lose much by eliminating the worse
worst case. But sometimes the worst-case is the worst by far, and some-
times we lose relatively little by choosing maximin. It is typically
thought necessary to assign probabilities in order to engage in cost-
benefit balancing; without an understanding of probabilities, such bal-
ancing might not seem able to get off the ground. But a useful form
of cost-benefit balancing is possible even without reliable information
about probability. For the balancing exercise to work, of course, it
must be possible to produce cardinal rankings among the outcomes-
that is, it must be possible to rank them not merely in terms of their
badness but also in at least rough terms of how much worse each is
than the less-bad others. That approach will not work if cardinal rank-
ings are not feasible-as might be the case if, for example, it is not
easy to compare the catastrophic loss from global warming with the
loss from huge expenditures on reductions of greenhouse-gas emis-
sions. Much of the time, however, cardinal rankings are possible.
Irreversibility becomes highly relevant as part of this analysis. Re-
call that some of the costs of precautions are irreversible. If govern-
ments invest a great deal to control greenhouse-gas emissions, they
will be forcing private and public actors to incur irreversible costs. It
follows that if governments follow maximin, they will be limiting their
own flexibility, expending a great deal even though future informa-
tion might move the situation from uncertainty to risk as regulators
learn more about the problem. Suppose that no probability can now
be assigned to the catastrophic risk associated with abrupt global
warming and that for this reason regulators are tempted to spend a
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great deal to eliminate that risk. The relevant expenditures will
greatly reduce future flexibility, ensuring sunk costs for a danger that
might turn out to be quantifiable or even trivial. This point is not
decisive against large expenditures, but it should be part of the analy-
sis of whether worst-case scenarios ought to be eliminated. In this
sense, there can be some tension between an Irreversible Harm Pre-
cautionary Principle and a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle.
Imagine, then, two polar situations with respect to global warm-
ing. First, suppose that the catastrophic dangers associated with
global warming could be eliminated if every nation contributed $10
million to a fund to combat that risk. On reasonable assumptions,
that cost would be fully acceptable. Second, suppose that the cata-
strophic dangers associated with global warming could be eliminated
only if every nation contributed enough resources to reduce standards
of living by 50% worldwide, with a corresponding increase in global
poverty. If global warming really does pose an uncertain danger of
total catastrophe, maximin argues in favor of this extraordinary reduc-
tion in worldwide standards of living. But to incur costs of this magni-
tude, we might want to insist that the danger of catastrophe rise above
the minimal threshold-that there be demonstrable probability (and
a not-so-low one) that the catastrophic risk will occur.
To appreciate this point, and the need for an analysis of the ef-
fects of following maximin, imagine an individual or society lacking
the information that would permit the assignment of probabilities to a
series of hazards with catastrophic outcomes; suppose that the number
of hazards is ten or twenty or a thousand. Suppose, too, that such an
individual or society is able to assign probabilities (ranging from 1%
to 90%) to an equivalent number of other hazards, with outcomes
that range from bad to extremely bad, but never catastrophic. Sup-
pose finally that every one of these hazards can be eliminated at a
cost-a cost that is high, but that does not, once incurred in individ-
ual cases, inflict harms that count as extremely bad or catastrophic.
The maximin principle suggests that our individual or society should
spend a great deal to eliminate each of the ten or twenty or thousand
potentially catastrophic hazards. But once that amount is spent on
even one of those hazards, there might be nothing left to combat the
extremely bad hazards, even those with a 90% chance of occurring.
We could even imagine that a poorly informed individual or society
would be condemned to real poverty and distress-or still worse-
merely by virtue of following maximin. In these circumstances, max-
imin should be rejected.
This suggestion derives indirect support from the empirical find-
ing that when asked to decide on the distribution of goods and ser-
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vices, most people reject the two most widely discussed principles in
the philosophical literature: average utility, favored by Harsanyi, and
Rawls's difference principle (allowing inequalities only if they work to
the advantage to the least well off).240 Instead, people choose average
utility with a floor constraint-that is, they favor an approach that
maximizes overall well being, but subject to the constraint that no
member of society may fall below a decent minimum. 241 Insisting on
an absolute welfare minimum to all, they maximize over that floor.
Their aversion to especially bad outcomes leads them to a pragmatic
threshold in the form of the floor. A similar approach is plausible in
the context of precautions against risks. A sensible individual-or so-
ciety-would not always choose maximin under circumstances of risk
or uncertainty. Everything depends on what is lost and what is gained
by eliminating the worst-case scenario; much of that time, available
information makes it possible to answer those questions at least in
general terms.
Nothing here is meant as proof that maximin is forbidden, or
even not required, by rationality. To decide on the relationship be-
tween rationality and maximin strategies, it is necessary to specify the
right account of rationality. 24 2 I am doubtful that any such specifica-
tion can establish the status of maximin without making contentious
assumptions. My claim is instead that maximin makes the most sense
when the worst-case scenario under one course of action is much
worse than the worst-case scenario under the alternative course of ac-
tion, and when the choice of maximin does not result in extremely
significant losses.
G. Dealing with Catastrophic Risks
The most general conclusion is that a degree of risk aversion
should be expected in cases of catastrophic risks; for such risks, mar-
gins of safety are entirely sensible. For this reason, a Catastrophic
Harm Precautionary Principle, of the sort suggested by several under-
standings of the Precautionary Principle, is a coherent and defensible
part of environmental policy. 243 Indeed, such a principle might well
be the best understanding of the Precautionary Principle itself. It has
many uses, not only in environmental policy but in health and safety
regulation as a whole, including the war on terrorism.
But maximin is not generally a sensible strategy in the environ-
mental context or elsewhere. First, it is senseless under circumstances
240 NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL
APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY 4-5(1992).
241 See id. at 82-94.
242 See LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 230, at 286-97.
243 See supra Part III.E.
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of risk, unless we assume an implausibly high degree of risk aversion.
Second, regulators are rarely operating under circumstances of pure
uncertainty; often rough probabilities can be ascribed to serious out-
comes, and if not, at least rough probabilities can be ascribed to
probabilities. Third, adoption of maximin under circumstances of
genuine uncertainty is most reasonable when the worst-case scenario
is exceptionally bad and when removal of that scenario does not in-
flict serious losses of its own.
It follows that a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle is
best understood to embody a form of risk aversion for the most dan-
gerous risks. Its central domain involves uncertain dangers of catas-
trophe when the costs of reducing those dangers are not huge and
when incurring those costs does not divert substantial resources from
extremely pressing problems. Four qualifications are important.
First, the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle must be at-
tentive to the full range of social risks; it makes no sense to take steps
to avert catastrophe if those very steps would create catastrophic risks
of their own. If a preventive war designed to reduce the risks of ter-
rorism from one source would increase those very risks from another
source, then the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle is inde-
terminate. This point is a simple extension of that made earlier with
respect to the unrefined Precautionary Principle and the Irreversible
Harm Precautionary Principle.
Second, use of the principle should be closely attentive to the
idea of cost-effectiveness, which requires regulators to choose the least
costly means of achieving their ends. In the context of global warm-
ing, there are many methods by which to reduce the relevant risks.244
Both nations and international institutions should choose those meth-
ods that minimize costs. The same is true for efforts to combat
terrorism.
Third, distributional considerations matter. The principle
should be applied in a way that reduces extreme burdens on those
least able to bear them. For global warming, there is a particular need
to ensure that citizens of poor nations are not required to pay a great
deal to contribute to the solution of a problem for which those in
wealthy nations are most responsible. 245 If an antiterrorism policy
would impose special burdens on members of racial and religious mi-
nority groups-consider racial profiling-it is worth considering
other policies that reduce or eliminate those burdens.
244 For a good discussion of various methods, see NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 71, at
121-44.
245 For an overview of international environmental regulation, see PERCIVAL ET AL.,
supra note 41, at 1033-1123.
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Fourth, costs matter as such. The extent of precautions cannot
reasonably be divorced from their expense. In cases of the kind I am
discussing, when the worst-case scenario is truly catastrophic and
when probabilities cannot be assigned, a large margin of safety makes
a great deal of sense. 246
There is a final point. It is possible to combine a concern about
catastrophe with a focus on irreversible harm in a way that generates
an Irreversible and Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle. Sup-
pose that by adopting environmental controls at the present time, reg-
ulators can maintain flexibility to prevent a risk that is not only
irreversible but potentially catastrophic as well. Suppose too that the
likelihood of catastrophe cannot be specified with much confidence,
or even that it is in the domain of uncertainty rather than risk. Risk-
neutral, risk-averse, or uncertainty-averse regulators might be willing
to pay a great deal to maintain the flexibility that would permit them
to avoid the worst-case scenarios. We have seen that significant ex-
penditures can reduce flexibility, too; many problems involve not irre-
versibility, but irreversibilities. At the same time, the most important
irreversibilities may well turn out to be environmental in character.
This argument provides the strongest basis for aggressive mea-
sures to combat global warming.247 The natural objections would ei-
ther point to the irreversible costs of maintaining flexibility or
question the probability that catastrophe will actually occur. The ap-
propriate conclusion rests on an assessment of the empirical ques-
tions,24 8 but in my view, an appreciation of irreversibility and
catastrophe argues for otherwise excessive steps to reduce greenhouse
gases.2 49
IV
RIVAL RATIONALITY REVISITED
When it comes to risk, why do experts disagree with ordinary peo-
ple? Many people think that the reason lies in the fact that ordinary
people have a "rival rationality. '" 250 On this view, experts are con-
cerned with statistics and, above all, with the number of lives at
246 See Woodward & Bishop, supra note 188, at 505 ("If one considers a spectrum of
choice problems from pure uncertainty to pure risk, almost all of the attention of econo-
mists has been on one extreme.... This has led to policy advice and analysis that either
implicitly or explicitly requires policymakers to divine probability distributions. We argue,
however, that there are important cases where probability distributions cannot be reasona-
bly formulated and under such conditions dramatically different decision criteria may be
rational.").
247 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 161-65.
248 See Fisher, supra note 96, for a good discussion.
249 See id.; Cline, supra note 176, at 15-21.
250 See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 5, at
220, 220-31.
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stake. 251 By contrast, ordinary people are concerned with a range of
qualitative factors that make certain risks a special cause of concern.
Irreversibility and catastrophe are said to loom especially large in ordi-
nary people's reactions.25 2 While experts simply calculate expected
values, ordinary people-and lay rationality-show special aversion to
potentially irreversible and catastrophic harm. If this is so, ordinary
people can be said to display rival rationalities. Both sides, expert and
layperson, have "something valid to contribute... [and] must respect
the insights and intelligence of the other."253
According to a competing view, the rival rationality of ordinary
people is mostly a product of cognitive illusions, ignorance, and con-
fusion.254 For the critics, ordinary people are also concerned with the
central question, which is the number of lives at stake. Unfortunately,
they are unable to answer that question well. When ordinary people
show a concern about irreversible and catastrophic harms, it is be-
cause they fear that many lives are at risk, no less and no more.
The discussion thus far suggests a possible rapprochement be-
tween the apparently rival rationalities. Sensible experts do not and
should not believe that there is any particular magic in irreversibility,
and they do and should insist that the line between catastrophic and
noncatastrophic harm is one of degree. But they should also agree
that irreversibility matters, in the sense that it makes sense to spend
resources to maintain flexibility for the future. Insofar as NEPA in-
structs agencies to spend time to acquire relevant information before
ensuring irreversible losses,25 5 it is on firm ground. Experts agree that
any cost-benefit analysis that ignores option value is missing an impor-
tant variable-a standard point in finance though not yet in environ-
mental protection.2 56 In this sense, ordinary people are correct to see
251 See id. at 223.
252 See Clayton P. Gillette &James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1027, 1061-85 (1990). Note that the evidence described above suggests that in certain
settings, potentially catastrophic outcomes will receive less-not more-attention than
their expected value, perhaps because people treat very low-probability risks (e.g., one in
one million) as if they were zero. The framing of the question undoubtedly matters a great
deal here. Probably the best generalization is that people sometimes give low-probability
risks of catastrophe more attention than their expected value and sometimes give high-
probability risks of catastrophe less attention than is warranted. See McClelland et al., supra
note 163, at 95. I suspect that in some of the relevant studies, the evidence of grave con-
cern for catastrophic harms stems from the "affect heuristic," through which a general
affective reaction to a risk-often a negative one-leads people to show concern about all
aspects of the relevant risk. See Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 397 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
253 Slovic, supra note 250, at 231.
254 See HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE EXPERTS DISA-
GREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1996).
255 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
256 See DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 86, at 4-7.
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the significance of irreversibility, and to emphasize the importance,
some of the time, of adopting a strategy of "act, and then learn."
What of catastrophic risks? Experts may have little to say on the
question of whether it is worse to create a 1/100 risk that 100,000
people will die, or a 1/1,000 risk that 1 million people will die. But
they should agree that when regulators are unable to assign probabili-
ties to catastrophic risks, it is worth doing a great deal to avoid those
risks-or at least to spend resources as a precaution while more infor-
mation is acquired. Experts cannot rule out the choice of maximin
under circumstances of uncertainty. At the very least, experts know
that elimination of the worst-case scenario is sometimes justified by a
kind of cost-benefit analysis, one that pays attention to the relative
egregiousness of the worst case and the costs of eliminating it. Sensi-
ble experts are interested not only in the expected value of cata-
strophic risks, but also in producing strategies for eliminating them
when probabilities cannot be confidently assigned. For these reasons,
an understanding of irreversibility and catastrophe help not only to
refine but also to vindicate intuitions that have been found to play a
significant role in ordinary risk perceptions.
CONCLUSION
The ideas of irreversibility and catastrophe have had a major im-
pact on domestic and international law, and they play a large role in
private and public decisions. My major goal in this Article has been to
unpack these ideas and to bring them to bear on law and policy. I
have suggested the possibility of replacing the Precautionary Princi-
ple, which is incoherent in its strong form, with more refined princi-
ples that embody an understanding of the distinctive problem of
irreversible losses and of the need to attend to low-probability risks of
disaster.
We have seen that an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle
is both plausible and coherent. Drawing on the idea of real options, it
suggests that regulators, including those who make environmental
policy, should find it worthwhile to invest resources to preserve flexi-
bility for the future. In the context of global warming, the Irreversible
Harm Precautionary Principle argues for substantial current invest-
ments, above all because emissions of carbon dioxide stay in the at-
mosphere for an extremely long time. The difficulty here is that
emissions reductions also impose irreversible costs. An emphasis on
irreversibility does not always favor aggressive environmental regula-
tion, or anything like an attitude of "act, then learn." It is even possi-
ble to imagine an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle that in
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many cases argues for a plan of "wait and learn."25 7 Everything de-
pends on the magnitude and likelihood of the full range of irreversi-
ble losses. In the context of global warming, the best approach is
probably a worldwide agreement to cap greenhouse emissions, with
the size of the cap decreasing over time as the expense of controls
diminishes.
If expected values matter, then societies should not ignore low-
probability risks of catastrophe. A minimal response would be a Cata-
strophic Harm Precautionary Principle, one that attempts to respond
to the serious possibility that both individuals and societies may treat
small risks as if they were zero. The argument for this principle is
strengthened by the fact that a catastrophic harm typically has secon-
dary adverse effects that go far beyond a simple multiple of the num-
ber of deaths. A less minimal approach would build a degree of risk
aversion into the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, so as to
treat catastrophic harms as worth more than their expected value. A
much more aggressive approach would be to adopt maximin, by
which regulators identify the worst-case scenario and attempt to elimi-
nate it. I have argued that for most environmental problems, this last
approach is senseless. Under circumstances of risk, maximin is far too
cautious, and it would inflict serious harms-often including environ-
mental harms-for no sufficient reason. Environmental problems
usually involve risk, in the sense that a range of probabilities can be
assigned, or at least in the sense that probabilities can be assigned to
probabilities.
As a matter of theory, pure uncertainty cannot be ruled out of
bounds. The fact that people assign probabilities to uncertain out-
comes does not negate the possibility that the outcome is objectively
uncertain. Under circumstances of uncertainty, maximin has some
appeal if the worst-case scenario is truly catastrophic. And if it is not
terribly costly to eliminate that scenario, regulators should certainly
do so. But maximin can be an unappealing strategy, certainly under
risk, and also when the worst-case scenario is not much worse than the
second-worst case scenario and when the costs of eliminating the
worst-case scenario are extremely high. To operate sensibly, precau-
tionary steps must be attentive to the full range of consequences, not
simply to a subset of them. But a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle, applied with a wide viewscreen, has an important role in
environmental law as well as ordinary life, and it is a strong candidate
for replacing and refining any more general Precautionary Principle.
257 See Mendelsohn, supra note 71, at 47.
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